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THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Title: A Pragmatic Realism: Events, Powers, and Relations in the Metaphysics of Objective 
Relativism 
 
 
 The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of “objective relativism,” a 
distinctly American school of metaphysical realism inspired by the works of John Dewey and 
A.N. Whitehead.  Largely forgotten, objective relativism provided a metaphysical framework, 
based upon an ontology of events and relations rather than substances and discrete 
properties, that has continued relevance for contemporary metaphysical discussions.  In this 
thesis, I attempt to chart the boundaries and pathways of this ontology, outlining what 
Dewey calls the “ground-map of the province of criticism.”  In particular, the ground-map 
of objective relativism is invoked to situate and analyze the model of psycho-physical 
emergence outlined in Dewey’s Experience and Nature.  Because it is a relational ontology, 
objective relativism avoids problems with emergence common to substantival models.  
Additional analyses of its ontological premises, both in Dewey’s writings and elsewhere, 
demonstrate how compelling accounts of causation, consciousness, and meaning may be 
formulated within this model. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN AMERICAN REALISM 
  
There were, according to A.O. Lovejoy (1930), two phases to the great revolt against 
dualism that defined the landscape of  American metaphysics in the early twentieth century.   
The first phase was the movement sometimes called new, naïve or neo-realism.  The second 
phase was the form of  contextualistic naturalism usually referred to as objective relativism, 
though it went by many other names as well.  Against both phases of  this revolt Lovejoy 
bore the standard of  a form of  dualism called critical realism.  Donald Oliver explains the 
controversy between the three schools in this way:  
 
Let us consider the three propositions: (1) This apple is sweet, (2) This apple possesses that  
which has the power of  producing the sensation of  sweetness in myself  and all other normally  
constituted human beings, (3) This apple is sweet for me and all other normally constituted human  
beings. The first is the predication of  naïve realism; the second is that of  critical  
 realism; the third is that of  perspective realism.1 
 
‘Perspective realism’ was one of  the many names of  objective relativism, the one preferred 
by Oliver and E.B. McGilvary (1956).  Though it is largely forgotten now, the pragmatic 
realism carved out by the objective relativists, I will argue, represents an important step in 
the evolution of  American metaphysics.  The term ‘objective relativism’ was the coinage of  
A.E. Murphy (1927), who chose the name to indicate a metaphysical tendency that he found 
to be common to the work of  both John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead.  Inspired by 
their work, Murphy sought a middle ground between two extremes, a position that would 
conserve the better part of  the objectivism of  the neo-realist and the relativism of  the 
critical realist.  It is this view that I will be concerned with in the following chapters.   
Though its roots extend at least to the Pre-Socratics,2 the most distinctive and 
significant features of  objective relativism originate within the theories and controversies of  
the American realists – William James,3 E.B. Holt,4 A.E. Murphy,5 E.B. McGilvary,6 John 
Dewey,7 A.N. Whitehead,8 A.O Lovejoy,9 and their respective collaborators and adversaries.10  
There is perhaps no other philosophical landscape that possessed the particular alchemical 
properties necessary to produce such a singular metaphysical current.  Telling the story of  
objective relativism thus requires telling, at least in part, the story of  the historical 
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controversies to which it was responding.  These disputes, their history and context, provide 
the meat of  Chapter II.   
The purpose of  this historical analysis is not merely to place objective relativism 
within its particular time and place, but also to make a preliminary step towards locating it 
within its particular conceptual geography, to locate its premises within the play of  ideas that 
occupied American philosophical realism in order to demonstrate why a radical ontology 
such as objective relativism was needed in order to advance the debate.   
John Dewey in particular plays a formative role in the development of  this 
movement.  Dewey was in many ways the standard-bearer for the anti-dualist insurgency, 
leading the charge in both the early direct realist and later contextualist phases of  the revolt.   
Dewey is a direct realist.  He is also an emergentist, an event ontologist, a pragmatist, and an 
objective relativist.  In this sense, Dewey may have been the quintessential American realist, 
even if he wasn’t always as realistic as he could have been.  He will accordingly play the role 
of  Virgil in this chapter and in the chapters following, providing direction and structure 
through the tangles and thickets of  the metaphysics of  objective relativism.   
 
The Ground-Map 
 
Dewey’s metaphysical writings, I will argue, afford a number of  excellent critical tools 
that have maintained their edge and relevance with regard to contemporary debates.  In 
particular, there are three tools that I will be borrowing from Dewey in the early chapters of  
the following.  The first of  these is Dewey’s notion of  metaphysics as “a ground-map of  the 
province of  criticism, establishing base lines to be employed in more intricate 
triangulations.”11  The term map may be taken generically to refer to a structural schematic, 
and this is the sense that I will be concerned with.  A metaphysical ground-map not only 
charts the paths for investigation and inquiry, but also places limits upon the paths of  inquiry 
that it is possible to undertake.  A metaphysical map thus serves as the transparent 
background that regulates the development of  ideas in other areas of  interest.   
W.V.O. Quine famously suggested that we think of  our most cherished background 
commitments as the more central nodes in a wider interconnected web of  belief.12  The web 
in this case represents a relatively coherent, interconnected network formed by our various 
beliefs and their relative influences upon one another.  Individual nodes within the web are 
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more or less connected and will thus impact more or less strongly upon other nodes.  Nodes 
that are more central will be more firmly entrenched; nodes closer to the periphery will be 
more passing and mutable.  Individual revisions within the web will be either selected or 
rejected based upon how little disruption they cause within the structure of  the whole.  Any 
such changes within the model will reverberate, sending shockwaves outward into the local 
ecology.  Minor revision will leave things more or less intact, while major shifts could cause 
more drastic structural changes.  Coherence thus increases in regions of  stability.   
Dewey’s metaphysical ground-map can be pictured as a formalization of  this 
concept, a model tracing and detailing the functional topology of  the web.  The beliefs that 
are of  concern in this case are those that inform and regulate our habitual metaphysical 
stances, and the ground-map is an articulation of  the structural contours of  such ontological 
background commitments.  These commitments are usually transparent; we are not aware 
most of  the time that they are even operative.  The choice of  what paths of  criticism will 
show up as live options however is conditioned and regulated by the contours of  this 
background theory.  The primary import of  this process is in the impact that our 
background commitments have upon the regulation of  our foreground concerns.  The 
metaphysical stances that we adopt will determine, at least in part, what paths of  inquiry will 
show up for us as live options.  Imagine the ground-map as genuinely marking off  the 
boundaries and limits of  exploration.  Statements that fail to conform to the schema will not 
even register as false; they will register as noise.  The role of  the map is thus essentially 
selective; it is the soil that will accept or reject individual seeds of  inquiry. 
In the following inquiry, the ground-map that we will assume is that of objective 
relativism.  Maps are tools, and the merit of a tool lies in the work that it does.  In the case 
of a metaphysical ground-map, that work is the elimination of philosophical problems.  In 
the following chapters, I will argue that an objective relativist ground-map affords 
compelling models of emergence, causation, consciousness, and meaning that avoid some of 
the pitfalls of more traditional models.  In addition, it achieves a good fit with the landscape 
of contemporary physics, ethology, ecology, and systems theory.  This is in a sense 
unsurprising; motivation for the objective relativist ontology comes in part from 
evolutionary biology via Dewey and in part from relativity theory via Whitehead.  Objective 
relativism is thus not only realistic, but also thoroughly naturalistic in its approach.   
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Charting the Province of Criticism 
  
Despite its seemingly radical position within the realist triarchy of  its time, objective 
relativism was, in its own way, a conservative movement.  By this I mean that its most 
important moves were based ultimately upon the constraint of  events and processes by events 
and processes occurring at higher levels of  analysis.  The ground-map constrains the moves 
on the board of  philosophical criticism.  Likewise, an event is constrained in its possible 
outcomes by the particular successes and failures that are encoded within its historical 
evolution.  Similarly, the context of  an event’s occurrence also constrains the values that it 
may ultimately manifest.   
 Talk of  constraints and higher and lower ontological levels immediately implies a 
stratified model of  nature.  Accordingly, the second tool borrowed from Dewey will be his 
model of  the emergence of  natural systems at different levels of  ontological analysis.   
Emergent theories of  mind have enjoyed an enduring popularity within philosophy, both 
because of  their intuitive appeal and, more importantly, because of  the failures of  
reductionist theories to provide suitable accounts of  the self-evident causal relevance of  
events at higher levels of  description.  Mereological forms of  reductionism, as Chapter III 
will argue, have difficulty with keeping causal powers operating realistically within the world, 
because of  the problem of  causal drainage.  Emergent theories based upon mereological 
supervenience have not fared better, and for similar reasons.  In fact, the mereological 
picture of  the world will be argued to be both philosophically and scientifically otiose; it has 
been surpassed in contemporary physics and is fatally unsuited to the philosophical analysis 
of  causation and modality.  In its place, a model of  emergence based upon Dewey’s 
naturalism will be introduced.  This model avoids the pitfalls of  mereology by virtue of  its 
underlying event ontology that places ontological emphasis upon the structural configuration 
of  systems as opposed to their mereological constitution.   
 The third critical tool utilized to carve out the edges of  the ground-map of  objective 
relativism will be the event ontology that is at the heart of  the metaphysics of  objective 
relativism.  In particular, an analysis will be undertaken of  the ways in which evolving, 
qualitatively individuated modal histories serve to unsettle the environing network of  
internal relations.  This relational background in turn structures, regulates, and ultimately 
selects the individual events that will emerge and endure.  This process, which is implicit in 
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Dewey’s ontology and in that of  his contemporaries such as A.E. Murphy and E.B. 
McGilvary, will be argued to provide a naturalistic foundation for the emergence of  
perspectivity in the world, and thus provides a crucial move in the establishment of  Dewey’s 
direct realism.  Strong objections will be considered to this view in Chapter IV, including 
several from Lovejoy, the most persuasive and vehement of  objective relativism’s adversaries. 
 Chapter V will serve to bring the ontology of  objective relativism into dialog with 
contemporary metaphysics.  In particular, I will follow the lead of  Andrew Ushenko and 
argue that defending objective relativism against challenges such as Lovejoy’s may be 
accomplished by treating dispositions with ontological seriousness.13  Thus a brief  overview of  
recent debates in the metaphysics of  dispositions will be provided, with particular regard 
given to the role of  qualities in a world that is ‘powerful all the way down.’  This discussion 
will be capped by the introduction of  a new model for the analysis of  events, based in the 
objective relativist ground-map that has been described thus far.  This will involve an 
abstract model of  a dispositional ecology, referred to as an event space, and the related 
processes of  modal interference and modal decay that may be employed to describe the evolution 
of  an event from its tensional initiation toward its final termination in a renewed systemic 
stability.  In response to concerns regarding emergence in Chapter III, the event space model 
will be used to illustrate a model of  causation that does not require lower-level events to be 
‘downwardly caused’ in any philosophically dubious sense. 
 The final chapter will return to Dewey’s emergence model with the tools unpacked in 
the previous four chapters.  Thus Chapter VI will be primarily concerned with elaborating 
upon the levels of  psycho-physical emergence and the temporal evolution of  events at each 
level.  New tools will be invoked for this analysis, in particular the notion of  affordances from 
James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology.  Support for Dewey’s model will also be summoned 
from the study in neuroethology of  the emergence of  planning in telereceptive organisms 
and the corresponding ecology-driven emergence of  consciousness into the world.  This 
chapter will conclude on a more critical note, as Dewey’s linguistic model of  meaning is 
examined and found ultimately unsuited to the ontological picture traced thus far.  In its 
stead, an alternative model will be briefly sketched that is more in harmony with the ground-
map of  objective relativism. 
 In closing, it should be noted explicitly that the version of  objective relativism that I 
will be ultimately conveying in this paper is not precisely Dewey’s version, nor is it 
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Whitehead’s, Murphy’s, or McGilvary’s.  But it has a bit of  them all, along with James 
Gibson, Mark Johnson, Nancy Cartwright, Karl Popper, Stephen Mumford, Werner 
Heisenberg, J.E. Boodin, Hilary Putnam, and the hard-headed schools of  contemporary 
British and Australian realism.  I do not claim that all or any of  the above would sign off  on 
anything that I have written here, but its virtues are theirs first and mine only by proxy.  Its 
defects are of  course mine alone.    
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Oliver 1938, p.197 
 
2 Heraclitus, in particular. 
 
3 Especially in the Essays in Radical Empiricism, 1916. 
 
4 Holt et. al. 1910, 1922. 
 
5 Murphy 1927. 
 
6 McGilvary 1956. 
 
7 Especially in Dewey’s “Postulate of  Immediate Empiricism” (MW3) and Experience and 
Nature (LW1). 
 
8 Especially in Whitehead 1925. 
 
9 Lovejoy 1930. 
 
10 A short list: Beck 1952; Lamprecht 1922 and 1929; Murphy 1927 and 1929; Ushenko 1946; 
McGilvary 1956; Oliver 1938; Boodin 1934; Piatt 1935; Hahn 1942; Meade 1964; Buchler 
1966; Lafferty 1949; and Stolnitz 1960. 
 
11 LW1:309. 
 
12 Quine “Two Dogmas of  Empiricism” 1980. 
 
13 Ushenko 1946.  The language of  ‘ontological seriousness’ with regard to dispositions 
comes from John Heil. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GREAT REVOLT 
 
 The metaphysical ground-map during Dewey’s time was largely dominated by the 
post-Hegelian idealism popular in the Anglo-American universities.  There was a sense at the 
time however that change was on the wing.  Certain ontological assumptions that had 
reigned, in some cases, for hundreds of years were being newly questioned in light of 
scientific developments.  Darwin had cut the legs from the view of nature as ‘fixed and 
final.’14  Einstein had similarly transformed Newton’s separate and absolute conceptions of 
space and time into a relationally-specified space-time manifold.  Upon the horizon, 
quantum theory was hinting at objective modalities within nature.15  The world seemed ripe 
for conceptual revolution. 
Dewey had in particular been deeply impressed by the emergence of evolutionary 
biology and tended as a result to look for ontological explanations in terms of function and 
fit.  If something like experience was to occur in the natural world, then it must have 
emerged for some purpose – namely, the ability of organisms to successfully engage their 
environment.  Direct realists such as Dewey thus assumed, optimistically but not 
unrealistically, that human experience was not an aberration in the world, that it was more or 
less precisely what it seems to be – a reliable medium through which to encounter and 
engage an objective and sometimes precarious environment.  What we directly experience, 
according to Dewey, is a portion of nature: 
 
[E]xperience is of as well as in nature.  It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature … Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is 
experienced.  Linked in certain other ways with another natural object – the human 
organism – they are how things are experienced as well.16 
 
He assumed this in part because experience is itself such a complex and intricate process.  
That any such fragile and rarified event as an experience could not only occur but flourish 
within nature, must, Dewey reasoned, be evidence that it is uniquely well-suited to its task.  
Otherwise, its continued existence would seem astonishing.  Because they are so complex 
and rarified, experiential events must therefore represent nature at its most intricate and 
vivid.  Experience is nature in full bloom, so to speak, and it thus represents the most precise 
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of tools for penetrating nature’s depths.17  Such observations do not, of course, represent 
anything like a proof for the suitability of experience to the world – there are a number of 
vestigial structures within evolved organisms that have lingered on despite serving no 
obvious purpose – but they do succeed in shifting the burden of demonstrating experience’s 
unsuitability to the anti-realist.  
Dewey’s metaphysical mappings were thus concerned to chart the most generic traits 
“manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to their differentiation into physical 
and mental.”18  If such structural regularities could be discovered to cut across the 
experience/nature divide, then Dewey reasoned that much of the work towards the 
reconciliation of nature would thereby be accomplished.  This notion is at the heart of 
Dewey’s principle of continuity.  Dewey sought to replace an ontology that bisected reality into 
mental and physical ‘realms’ with an emergent ontology that viewed mental events as more 
complex instantiations of the sorts of functions and processes that are ubiquitous 
throughout nature.  Experience is thus both emergent from and continuous with the generic 
patterns and regularities that define nature as a whole. 
 
The New Realisms 
 
Lovejoy identifies the birth of  the new American realism with the publication of  
William James’ paper, “Does Consciousness Exist?”19  In it, James argues that philosophical 
tradition has generally erred in treating consciousness as if  it were a substantial, self-
sufficient entity.  Instead, James argued that consciousness should be understood as a 
functional relation.  Just as a single point may mark the intersection of  two lines, a single 
object may form the intersection of  two unique histories, one physical and one mental.20  
Any single object within the environment can thus enter into any number of  simultaneous 
‘physical’ or ‘mental’ relations.   
Harlow (1931) recalls that the dominance of  idealism in the American academy at 
the turn of  the century gave a genuine sense of  urgency and intellectual revolt to James’ 
lectures.  Students flocked to his philosophy as an antidote to the (then) old-fashioned 
dogmas of  the academy.  Among the ranks of  these enthusiastic realists were James’ pupils 
R.B. Perry and E.B. Holt from Harvard, W.T. Marvin and E.G. Spaulding from Princeton, 
and W.B. Pitkin and W.P. Montague from Columbia.  In the belief  that philosophers would 
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do well to follow the example of  the sciences and eschew isolated system-building in favor 
of  collaborative and targeted inquiry, these six combined forces to pen the brief  “Program 
and First Platform of  Six Realists” in 1910, and, later, a more detailed and thorough analysis 
in a collection of  essays titled The New Realism (1922).   
The neo-realists agreed with James that the objects of  experience were directly 
present in perception.  They thus strongly rejected the representational and sense data 
theories of  knowledge.  Like James, they sought to escape dualism “by employing the notion 
of  relation in place of  the notion of  substance.”21  In contrast to the internal, constitutive 
relations favored by idealists, the neo-realists insisted that relations were extrinsic to their 
objects.  Such relations, they argued, are selective rather than constitutive, they picked out 
independent objects in the environment without entering at all into their constitution.  
Consciousness, as a special sort of  relation, is analogous to the beam of  a searchlight; it 
picks out and illuminates certain features that are objectively present within the environment.  
This reconciliation of  immanence (the direct presence of  objects in experience) and 
independence (the mind-independent existence of  objects) was the main issue at stake for the 
neo-realists.  Idealism affirmed immanence while denying independence; dualism affirmed 
independence while denying immanence.  The neo-realists insisted upon having both.   
Not surprisingly, the position of  the new realists met with formidable resistance.  
When the six realists published their first collaborative paper, idealism was the coin of  the 
academy.  Ten years later the metaphysical ground-map had changed dramatically, and it was 
from defenders of  dualism that the most ferocious challenges emerged.  This time it was 
seven scholars collaborating – Durant Drake, A.O. Lovejoy, J.B. Pratt, A.K. Rogers, George 
Santayana, R.W. Sellars, and C.A. Strong.  These seven combined their considerable talents to 
mount an explicit counter-attack against all “neo-realists, idealists, and believers in ‘pure 
experience.’” 22 They called their position critical realism.   
As a counter-insurgency, the critical realists had no better standard bearer than 
Lovejoy, who seemed to be waging a relentless and brilliant one-man campaign against every 
manner of nonsense that the younger generation of philosophers might be getting up to.  
The neo-realists, as Lovejoy (1930) was eager to point out, were quite comfortable 
accounting for the sorts of  common, everyday veridical perceptions familiar to non-
philosophers, but seemed less at ease when considering how sense was to be made of  
hallucinations, dreams, or perceptual illusions.  Consider for example two individuals, Alice 
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and Bob, who are standing right beside one another, looking at the same red apple.  It could 
be the case that Alice and Bob, despite the similarity of their situations, are having 
completely different perceptual experiences.  Alice, being of sound mind, sees before her a 
ruddy, roughly spheroid fruit.  Bob, who has ingested the sort of conveniently super-
powered hallucinogen that exists only in philosophical thought experiments, sees before him 
a towering and likely very irate blue dragon.  We want to affirm that Alice is having a 
veridical perceptual experience, and that Bob is hallucinating.  Further, we want to say that 
Bob’s perception is false.   
The identification by neo-realists of the content of perception with its object makes 
this determination problematic.  In fact, the simplest explanation, according to the critical 
realists, is to say that Bob’s perception is false because the blue-dragon doesn’t exist in the 
world outside of Bob’s brain.  Alice and Bob perceive the same object (the apple), but they 
have different mental contents (their respective mental representations).  When Alice looks 
at the red apple, her mind’s eye constructs a simulation out of pixels of redness and roundness 
and other bits of qualia.  Critical realism thus endorses an epistemic dualism of content and 
object that has the advantage of being far more tolerant of naturalism than other, more 
ontologically dualist varieties.  The critical realist could thus accept that minds were 
ultimately natural phenomena of whatever sort, while at the same time denying that the 
contents of perceptions were identical to the physical objects that they represented.   
 Unfortunately, this position leaves the critical realists as baffled by veridical 
perceptions as the naïve realists were by hallucinations.  If  the direct realists had no 
compelling explanation for the fact that we sometimes get things wrong in perception, the 
critical realists could not offer a satisfactory explanation for how we could ever possibly get 
anything right.  The problem, familiar to Descartes and Locke, is that once you classified all 
perceptual data as inner or subjective representations, you lose all warrant for claiming that 
individual representations in fact corresponded to anything external at all.  How do you 
verify the truth of any individual simulation if all that you ever encounter are more 
simulations?   
We are left then with a metaphysical ground-map divided between two opposing 
dogmas, neither of which seems adequate as it stands to the phenomena it set out originally 
to explain.  It was left for a new movement to light a torch in the darkness.  This is, of 
course, where objective relativism enters the story. 
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The Rise of  Objective Relativism 
 
The objective relativists had the advantage of  inheriting the successes of  their 
predecessors while learning also from their respective failures.  They were thus able to 
embody the better angels of  both the new and critical realisms, as well as the objective 
idealism that preceded them.  This they accomplished by retaining what was most empirically 
compelling about both the ‘idealistic’ doctrine of  the internality of  relations and the 
‘realistic’ doctrine of  a mind-independence of  properties. 
The union of  Dewey and Whitehead forged by Murphy in his seminal paper 
“Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead” seemed audacious at the time; each 
philosopher on the surface seemed to have little in common with the other.23  In the work of  
both, however, Murphy noted a strong rejection of  bifurcationism, the thesis that reality is in 
some sense divided between two opposing realms – one mental, the other physical.  Further, 
this denial of  bifurcation in both Dewey and Whitehead is warranted by a deeper rejection 
of  a substantival metaphysics.  In its place, both philosophers offer naturalistic ontologies of  
coarse-grained and dynamic events.  Murphy locates a central claim at the heart of  the 
ontologies of  both philosophers: 
 
(a) The objective facts of  the world of  nature and of  reality are the very ‘apparent’  
and relative happenings directly disclosed to us in perception.   
 
 (b) In spite (or because) of  such objectivity such happenings remain ultimately and 
 inescapably relative.  Such relativity is hence an ultimate fact about the objective 
 world.24 
 
To illustrate, Murphy considers a book on a table in his room.  Conceived as an object, the 
book possesses an essential nature that is unaltered by its inclusion within any set of  
extrinsic relations.  This, roughly, was the position of  the neo-realists.  But conceived as an 
event, the book forms a part of  what Murphy calls the ‘total situation.’25  By this Murphy 
means that the fact of  the book is manifested under circumstances in which it is situated 
upon a particular table at a particular time as a result of  a particular series of  historical 
events, etc.  Murphy explains: 
 
As an event, the situation is caught up in a whole network of  interactions and 
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circumstances, without which it would not be what it is.  In other words the relations 
of  an event are internal, and it is precisely that fact which distinguishes it from an 
object.26 
 
The quality of  the event is thus conditioned by the mutual reciprocity of  its internal relations 
(i.e. the book is on the table and the table is under the book).  Relations, in this sense, are 
symmetrical.  The terms of  a relation function both as agent and patient relative to one 
another – each contributes to the specification of and is in part specified by the other.  Any 
difference-making function that holds between two or more terms is thus a relation.  The 
result is an ontology in which every event is specified relative to some network of  further 
events.  In laying out the ontology of  his own ‘perspective realism,’ McGilvary drafted a list 
of  three postulates (and a corollary) that makes the objective relativist stance on relations 
plain: 
 
 Postulate 1.  In our sense-experience there is presented to us in part the real world in which we all in 
 common live and move and have our being.27  
 
Postulate 2.  Every particular in the world is a member of  a context of  particulars and is what it 
is only because of  its context; and every character any member has it has only by virtue of  its 
relations to other members of  that context.28 
 
Postulate 3. In the world of  nature any “thing” at any time is, and is nothing but, the totality of  
the relational characters, experienced or not experienced, that the “thing” has at that time in 
whatever relations it has at that time to other “things.”29  
 
Corollary: Every character which any thing has at any time it has only as it is a term of  some 
relation  in which at that time it stands to some other thing.30  
 
We may draw from these postulates a generalized maxim, that I will call McGilvary’s Maxim: to 
be is to be a term in a network of  relations. 
 Following Murphy’s baptismal paper, the term ‘objective relativism’ quickly began to 
spread and evolve.  Sterling Lamprecht invoked it sympathetically in relation to his own 
relational metaphysics.31  Ernest Nagel called it “without question America’s most significant 
contribution to philosophic intelligence.”32  W.P. Montague found it, not necessarily 
sympathetically, to be “the essence of  American New Realism.”33  Victor Harlow, in his 
Genetic Study of  American Realism, refers to it as “the most promising of  all the realisms for the 
thought of  the immediate future.”34  But it was likely Lovejoy’s characterization of  objective 
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relativism as the mature phase of  the ‘great revolt against dualism’ which constituted “the 
most characteristic and ambitious philosophic effort of  our generation”35 that codified the 
term.  
 A flourishing diversity of  metaphysical naturalisms began to emerge during this 
period, each sharing a central core of  related concerns, yet answering to an embarrassment 
of  different “-isms.”  Over the course of  five decades the central network of  commitments 
that Murphy noted in Dewey and Whitehead turned up with minor variations as functional 
realism,36 contextualism,37 natural realism,38 empirical naturalism,39 and perspective realism40 – just to 
name a few.41  Regardless, it is the term ‘objective relativism’ that has persisted, for better or 
for ill, and that is the term I shall use. 
 As befits a philosophy with such a proliferation of  strains and mutations, objective 
relativism developed no set doctrine, no single holy writ, and no exhaustive list of  
commandments.  Instead, it is characterized by a mutable web of  interrelated ontological 
concerns.  Process ontology, pragmatism, relational cosmology, and direct perceptual realism 
all, to varying degrees, play a part in the discussion.42  Objective relativist authors, as Thomas 
Robischon notes, have as a result tended to emphasize some of  these traits over others 
within their writings, contributing to a perception of  ambiguity within the theory.43  It was 
thus in part the very conceptual pluralism that fed the theory that contributed ultimately to 
its decline.  I will attempt in this paper to unravel some of  these tangled threads and thickets, 
but first a few words must be said regarding the trajectory of  objective relativism’s decline, 
and indeed regarding the decline of  metaphysics in general within the Anglo-American 
academy. 
 
The Fall of  Objective Relativism 
 
In 1956, McGilvary’s long-awaited Towards a Perspective Realism, a volume that rests 
beside Dewey’s Experience and Nature and Whitehead’s Science and the Modern World as a classic 
within the objective relativist cannon, was posthumously released.   This was a watershed 
moment for American realism.  Yet, when commenting upon McGilvary’s magnum opus, 
Murphy ironically mused that “it was as if  signals from a remote philosophical planet, 
traveling at something less than the velocity of  light, were now presented in a frame of  
reference ill-adapted to their appropriate reception.”44  Murphy had by this point become 
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increasingly dissatisfied with ‘speculative philosophy’ in general and his own metaphysical 
offspring in particular.  So it was that the philosopher who gave objective relativism its name 
would take up his pen once more, this time to announce its demise.45  At a time when 
philosophers were increasingly focused upon honing their skills in conceptual analysis, 
Murphy began to see the clash of  realisms as having been superseded by the clear and 
precise study of  language and logic.  What, Murphy wonders, would a Wittgensteinian think 
of  such controversies?46  
 This opinion was not unique to Murphy.  By the middle of  the twentieth century, the 
world of  philosophy had moved on, and metaphysics was being increasingly left out of  the 
discussion.  The ground-map of  American metaphysics, which had been split among the 
combative siblings of  neo-realism, critical realism, and objective relativism, shifted 
dramatically as the dual fists of  logical positivism and postmodernism began to close around 
it.  These anti-metaphysical schools, along with the current of  so-called ‘neo-pragmatism,’ 
each carved their own marks upon an increasingly barren ontological ground-map.  
While Dewey’s writings on education, democracy, art, and social theory have 
continued to be widely influential, the standing of  his metaphysical musings has diminished 
somewhat as the center of  the general conversation has drifted over time.  Students of  
Whitehead have meanwhile forged their own path, largely in isolation from the mainstream 
of  Anglo-American metaphysics.   As for McGilvary, Murphy, and the other objective 
relativists of  the time, their writings have been largely neglected within the contemporary 
debate.  Objective relativism, with a few scattered exceptions,47 seemingly vanished from the 
philosophical landscape.  It was not so much that its arguments had been decisively refuted; 
it was that it asked questions about which most philosophers had agreed not to care. 
 
Objection: The Possibility of  a Pragmatic Metaphysics 
 
 Some contemporary pragmatists, such as Richard Rorty (1982) and Charlene 
Haddock Seigfried (2004), have expressed degrees of  disapproval ranging from mild scorn to 
outright hostility towards the metaphysical aspects of  Dewey’s legacy.48  There has in fact 
been a strong thread of  resistance from this quarter to the very notion of  a pragmatic 
metaphysics.  As an unfortunate result, pragmatists have in general enjoyed a limited and 
somewhat marginalized role within contemporary metaphysical discussions. 
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 Rorty praises Dewey’s pragmatic instincts for noting that the problems of  
philosophy are not neutral to history and culture.  This realization, according to Rorty, 
suggests however that we never arrive at any ‘permanent neutral matrix’ outside of  language 
or culture from which to survey Dewey’s generic traits of  existence.  As Rorty describes the 
situation, Dewey’s talk of  generic traits is in conflict with his pragmatism.  There are two 
horns to the dilemma.  If  Dewey grabs the first horn, he admits that there are no traits 
suitably generic to transcend local cultural norms.  This would bring Dewey’s position closer 
to Rorty’s brand of  cultural relativism.  If  he grabs the second horn, however, he assumes 
the foundationalist stance of  an omniscient observer and thus forfeits his pragmatism.  
Neither horn seems particularly appealing.   
One possible answer to Rorty is to simply bite the bullet and agree that what Dewey 
has constructed is a model of  a foundationalist metaphysics.  In a sense, this is plainly true.  
Dewey explicitly denotes events as his fundamental ontological units and then proceeds to 
analyze the emergence of  matter, life, and society on this basis.  The emergence model 
outlined within the following chapters is a blueprint for an internally consistent system in the 
strong sense of  the term.  Any metaphysical model must to some degree operate in this 
fashion if  it is to hold together well enough to direct philosophical criticism.  We isolate 
nature’s traits and habits into clear ontological categories in order to analyze their patterns 
and structure.  Philosophers do this in conceptual analysis.  Scientists do this when they 
shield off  interferences in an experiment.  It is in general a good strategy.  Successful 
navigation of  the world hinges upon the ability of  organisms to successfully anticipate what 
sorts of  effects may be realized by what sorts of  interactions.  It makes sense then to map 
such generic patterns in order to work towards an understanding of  their powers and 
potentials. 
What is striking about Dewey’s model is that it is explicitly a model; it represents, in a 
sense, metaphysics become self-aware.  The ground-map is constructed with no expectation 
that it will be the perfect or final word on the matter; premises are always subject to further 
criticism and revision.   This is because Dewey’s conception of  metaphysics recognizes the 
ground-map itself  to be among the objects of  criticism.  As with any map, the lines of  
orientation must be periodically updated and redrawn.49  The metaphysician is thus more 
cartographer than cataloger, honing the contours and boundaries of  the space of  inquiry, 
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carving endlessly at nature’s background structure in order to bring the foreground into 
sharper relief.   
 Difficulties may begin to emerge however if  we forget that we are working with 
models.  To stave off  this possibility, an adequate model for a pragmatic metaphysics should 
thus not only function as the background to critical inquiry, but also as the instrument and the 
object of  inquiry.  As an instrument of  criticism, a metaphysical map should function as a tool 
for the crafting of  better, more specialized tools.  As an object of  criticism, it should present 
itself  among the objects to be revised as necessary to remain suitable to the demands of  
inquiry.  As the background to criticism, it should outline in broad strokes the formal 
landmarks that structure and regulate the space of  inquiry.   
 
Objection: The Purpose of  a Pragmatic Metaphysics 
 
There is a world however between can and should.  Dewey can construct an 
explicitly pragmatic metaphysics, but this does not necessarily imply that he should have 
bothered.  Rorty questions “why we need a discipline at that level of  generality” and wonders 
how its results could be “anything but trivial.”50  Seigfried is similarly critical of  Dewey’s 
metaphysical aspirations.  Dewey would have been better served, by her account, to point us 
“away from metaphysical ways of  thinking to fully engage in critical thinking and world-
transforming.”51  Her central concern is that engaging in metaphysical inquiry constitutes “at 
least a distraction from the concrete concerns of  everyday life and at most a tragic detour 
away from everything that gives value and meaning to life.”52   
This objection seems strange to me.  It is as if  someone demanded that the 
department of  mathematics be shut down because the study of  calculus could represent a 
potential distraction from the important work of  community outreach.  Surely there is room 
in the academy for world-transforming cultural anthropologists and metaphysical pragmatists 
alike.  It seems strange also because it implies that metaphysical commitments are the sorts 
of  things that one can simply choose not to have.  One is reminded of  McGilvary’s wry 
comment regarding behaviorism: “The reason it has not recognized its metaphysical status is 
that for it only that metaphysics is metaphysics which is not its own metaphysics.”53   
Seigfried’s view on this matter seems to miss Dewey’s point about metaphysics 
entirely.  No one faces the arena of  experience without a ground-map already in place.  
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Seigfried writes of  “the bio-historical development of  minded organisms in social and 
natural environments” as if  these concepts swing free of  the sorts of  structural background 
commitments that concerned Dewey.54  It is just this type of  assumption that Dewey is 
warning us against.  Philosophers who claim to not be operating within a metaphysical map 
of  some sort do so because their map has long burned into grooves and become 
transparent.  But if  we forget that our metaphysical ground-map is a model, if  we begin to 
take it for granted as a brute uncovered fact, then our background commitments drop out of  
view of  criticism and begin the long journey into dogma.  The more certain one is of  his 
commitments, Dewey reminds us, the more likely he is “to direct the conduct of  life, that of  
others as well as of  himself, upon the basis of  the character assigned to the world.”55  
 
The Aftermath 
 
Philosophy, like any other discipline, is subject to fashions, trends, and paradigm 
shifts.  What was once new and exciting may become entrenched and stale, and ideas 
thought long dead may suddenly erupt into new life.  The death of  metaphysics, as it turns 
out, was announced somewhat prematurely.  The story of  its return to respectability in the 
latter half  of  the twentieth century is now familiar.  Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, David K. 
Lewis, David Armstrong, and others have ably demonstrated that new blood may still be 
drawn from the stone of  ontology.  The dire situation that Murphy described in 1963 is thus 
long out of  date; the philosophical reign of  the logical positivists and their hard-line anti-
metaphysical sympathizers has passed.   
Contemporary inquirers have access now to tools, crafted over a century of  scientific 
and metaphysical advances and innovations, which were unknown to the early objective 
relativists.  What seemed loose and speculative in 1925 may now be treated with clarity and 
precision.  To the objective relativist arsenal of  events, relations, and situations I will thus be 
adding contemporary tools and concepts drawn from the metaphysics of  dispositions, 
emergent systems, and the philosophy of  physics.  I will attempt, wherever reasonable, to 
keep the discussion grounded in the results of  empirical inquiry.  Contemporary research in 
neuroethology, quantum theory, and ecological psychology is thus represented in the 
following chapters, though only briefly.  I have tried in such cases to keep the discussion 
moving briskly rather than dwelling upon the gory details of  auxiliary theories.   
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The time is right for a reassessment of  the metaphysics of  objective relativism, not 
only because the contemporary metaphysical ground-map bears more than a passing 
resemblance to the ambitions of  the objective relativists, but also because in many important 
respects it as of  yet does not.  The implications of  Darwinian selection for the types of  
events and properties that concern metaphysics has hardly advanced since Dewey.  Relativity 
is rarely invoked at all outside of  the philosophy of  physics.  Quantum mechanics, when it is 
mentioned, is typically mentioned in service of  some fantastical thought experiment far 
removed from practicality.  Outside of  philosophy of  physics journals, there is a resilient 
tendency among philosophers to theorize as if  scientific advancement ended with Clerk 
Maxwell.  The billiard-balls-in-a-box universe of  classical physics is simply more reassuring 
and familiar than the weird tales drifting from modern physics departments; it is a fiction 
that we may comfortably slip into whenever our intuitions become overtaxed.  
 But the objective relativists were braver than this, and we should follow their lead.  
The contours of  the ground-map are always in need of  revision somewhere.  If, in our 
explorations, we find that the existing lines upon the map are ill-drawn, we may attempt to 
make emendations.  Some of  these may prove fortuitous.  Alterations that are reliably 
beneficial will thus sink into background and harden into habit.  In this way the conceptual 
territory represented by the ground-map evolves and adapts to the changing territory of  
experience and experimentation.  If  the operation of  our ground-map on the other hand 
works to shield off  internal criticisms or to stifle inquiry, then our map has outlived its 
usefulness and should be discarded.  In the next chapter, it will be argued that contemporary 
philosophy still operates to some degree upon an outdated ground-map, which I will refer to 
as naïve physicalism, and that a seemingly fearsome challenge to Dewey’s ontology is in fact 
merely the result of  leaving old landmarks upon the map intact, though the territory of  
empirical data has transformed dramatically. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PERILS OF NAÏVE PHYSICALISM 
 
 The second tool that I will borrow from Dewey is his model of  psycho-physical 
emergence.  The following chapters will be concerned with filling in the details and contours 
of  the sort of  ground-map that needs to be in place in order to drive the model of  the 
emergence of  consciousness from nature set out by Dewey in Chapter VII of  Experience and 
Nature.  I provide a quick and rough overview of  this model at the conclusion of  the present 
chapter.   
Dewey’s model represents a particular example of a more general philosophical trend 
with regard to the understanding of the mind in nature.  Emergent theories of mind were 
popular during Dewey’s time and they have enjoyed a similar resurgence in recent years.56   
The generic rallying cry of emergentism has typically been ‘the whole is more than the sum 
of the parts,’ and this is true of Dewey’s model as well.  Stated more precisely for present 
purposes: there are properties of systems that exist at higher levels of functional organization 
that are not explicable as terms of sums of properties that exist at lower levels.  To cite a 
common example, it is sometimes claimed that no analysis of the individual properties of 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms will be sufficient to explain the property of ‘wetness.’  Wetness 
is therefore a higher-order property that is ‘something more’ than a listing of the properties 
of its constitutive parts.  Call this the irreducibility thesis.  In debates over the ontological status 
of mind in nature, this thesis typically gets cashed out in the claim that a description of 
consciousness cannot be provided in terms of a complete description of the physical state of 
the organism.  There is thus something more to be said about mental states over and above 
what a mature physics would say.   
The most controversial aspect of emergentism is the notion that there are higher-
order properties that are somehow new to the world at their level of organization.  Within the 
ontological picture, common to much of traditional metaphysics, of the world as composed 
out of different arrangements of a fixed set of discrete fundamental properties, such 
emergence seems to represent a rupture of the continuity of nature.  Accounts that explicitly 
affirm such a position may be referred to as strongly emergent.  Such accounts have struck some 
as implausible because they seem to imply that the emergence of properties represents an 
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example of the creation ex nihilo.  New properties seem to appear in the world ‘as if by 
magic’ at the achievement of certain compositional thresholds.57  In the following, I argue 
that the need for this (too) strong form of  emergence may be obviated by moving from a 
compositional to a configurational ontology.  Talk of  the emergence of  new properties 
seems less mysterious if  such properties are understood to be functions that systems 
perform rather than something that systems ‘have.’ 
In focusing specifically upon Dewey’s model in particular, I do not want to suggest 
that every step and definition along the way is a definitive or even a good approximation of  
the world.  I find Dewey’s linguistic account of  mind unconvincing, for example.  Where 
Dewey succeeds is in bringing the relational context and the historical conditioning of  events 
together into a picture that is both philosophically satisfying and respectful of  the empirical 
facts.  Dewey provides nothing less than a fully naturalized step-by-step account of  the 
emergence of  higher cognitive functions out of  inanimate systems.  The beauty of  such a 
model from a naturalistic perspective is that it locates the mechanisms for the emergence of  
dynamic processes within the operations of  nature itself, thus removing the need to 
outsource that work to external laws, supernatural agencies, the transcendental ego, or what 
have you.  It is more remarkable for the degree of  structural continuity that Dewey is able to 
locate across multiple levels of  functional organization.  Where the model succeeds, it seems 
genuinely to latch onto the ‘generic traits of  existence,’ or at least some of  them. 
Before moving on to a more detailed examination of  Dewey’s model, however, a few 
moments should be spared to consider one of  the more formidable challenges that face any 
model of  ontological emergence. 
 
Emergence and Reduction 
   
As Jaegwon Kim notes, the fortunes of emergence and reductionism are inversely 
proportional – what counts in favor of the one will count against the other.58  In its stronger 
forms, reductionism tends towards some version of the claim that there are no events in 
nature that are not describable in the vocabulary of a mature physics.59  Once you have the 
physical (or perhaps quantum mechanical) description of the entire universe, you have 
exhausted all that can be meaningfully said.  Talk of the quality of the experience may here be 
regarded as loose and unsophisticated; what such talk actually refers to is physical quantities if 
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it refers to anything at all.  Kim simply refers to this position as ‘physicalism,’ defining it as 
the thesis that “all things that exist in this world are bits of  matter and structures aggregated 
out of  bits of  matter, all behaving in accordance with laws of  physics,” and “any 
phenomenon of  the world can be physically explained if  it can be explained at all.”60 
 This view, not surprisingly, has enjoyed far more popularity among physicists and 
philosophers than it has among biologists, psychologists, or anthropologists, and for good 
reason.  It is obviously too strong.  Despite a handful of  individual successes, this form of  
reductionism has in general failed to provide anything like an uncontroversial account of  the 
wholesale reduction of  any particular level of  inquiry to any other.61  
We can of  course tell a rich quantitative story of  the redness of  the apple in terms 
of  its ability to absorb and reflect light in combination with the neuro-visual architecture of  
Bob and Alice, but this seems, as legions of  thought experiments have pointed out, to 
explain everything but the redness of  the apple.62  Similarly, there seems to be no complete 
quantitative description of waveform values that could adequately convey the experience of 
listening to Beethoven’s Sonata No. 14.  An overly strong program of reductionism thus 
seems as intuitively unappealing as an overly strong program of emergence.   
 The standard compromise is that some form of  supervenience relation is necessary to 
keep mind tethered to the physical world without reducing it away.63  Supervenience is 
typically understood as the thesis that there can be no difference in higher-order 
(supervenient) properties without a corresponding difference in their lower-order 
(subvenient) property base.  Kim (1993) fleshes out this notion in terms of  an asymmetrical 
relation of  mereological composition.  The properties of  higher-order macro-scale objects 
(e.g. water molecules, baseballs, etc.) are symmetrically dependent upon their micro-scale 
subvenience base (elementary particles) because the properties of  the former are realized by 
the composition of  the latter.  This version of  dependence, which is cashed out in terms of  
the relationship between parts and wholes, is sometimes called mereological supervenience.64  
Since the powers and properties of  macro objects are ‘nothing over and above’ the sum of  
the properties of  their micro-scale constituents, then any two worlds that are identical with 
regard to the spatio-temporal arrangement of  their most fundamental physical parts are also 
identical in every other way.   
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Objection: Causal Exclusion 
 
Kim however has demonstrated convincingly that accounts of emergence predicated 
upon a relationship of mereological supervenience are doomed to fail, at least if 
epiphenomenalism is to be avoided.65  Mental acts, according to the epiphenomenalist, are 
incapable of  causing any change in the world; mind is in effect ‘just along for the ride.’  
Samuel Alexander famously mocked this position for supposing “something to exist in 
nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of  noblesse which depends on 
the work of  its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtably would in 
time be abolished.”66  Kim (1992) refers to this as Alexander’s Dictum, and it comes down to 
this: to be is to be causally relevant.  If  it can be shown that mind, under an emergentists 
description, reduces to an epiphenomenal ‘residue,’ then that should count as a strong 
argument against emergentism. 
To illustrate this, Kim invokes the notion of causal exclusion, which states that no 
effect has more than one sufficient cause (or set of  causes).  Consider Figure 1 below:   
P P*
M M*
= Causation
= Constitution
 
Figure 1. Kim’s Model of Causal Exclusion 
 
 
We generally suppose that our desire to raise our hand is the cause of our effort to 
raise our hand.  Let this desire be called mental state M and let the resulting mental effort be 
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called mental state M*.  Thus M is supposed to be the cause of M*.  According to 
mereological supervenience, both of these mental states supervene upon their respective 
physical-state realizers.  Let physical states P and P* then be the respective realizers of M and 
M* such that M and M* necessarily emerge at instances of P and P*.   
This is where causal exclusion kicks in.  M cannot be the direct cause of M* because 
the existence of P* is sufficient by itself to account for the instantiation of M*.  The only 
alternative possibility is for M to enter earlier in the causal chain that terminates in M*, and 
thus function as an indirect cause.  But every mental state has a sufficient physical cause.  The 
only option then is for M to function as the cause of P*.  This would constitute a form of 
downward causation, where higher-order properties are causally efficacious with regard to 
lower-order properties.  Emergentists, Kim argues, are necessarily committed to some form 
of downward causation. 
The problem is that P* already has a sufficient physical cause in the form of P.  
There is in fact nothing here for M to do; every effective move within this transaction has 
been sufficiently determined by P or P*.  Thus M and all higher-order states like M are 
excluded from playing a causal role in the world.  This leaves us with two choices: either (a) 
we reject the irreducibility thesis and admit that talk of mental states is just misguided talk of 
microphysical states or (b) we keep irreducibility but reject downward causation and admit 
that mental properties are powerless in the world.67  Thus (a) is equivalent to a claim of 
reductionism and (b) to a claim of epiphenomenalism, two equally unappealing choices. 
The problem with this account, as Ned Block (2003) has shown, is that Kim’s 
argument generalizes greedily.68  Kim has not simply demonstrated that mental properties are 
made causally impotent by their realizers; he has shown that all higher-order properties must 
be excluded from the causal-physical order.  Causation may be shown to drain down always to 
the level just beneath the level of inquiry, until all causal efficacy presumably ‘bottoms out’ at 
the fundamental level of elementary physics.  This leads to the counterintuitive conclusion 
that it is not the baseball (or its powers) that breaks the window, rather it is the fundamental 
particles that constitute the baseball that do all the causal work.  This goes for all systems at 
all scales; anything that is not irreducibly basic is forbidden from making a difference to the 
world.69    
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Naïve Physicalism 
 
 From the perspective of an event ontology such as objective relativism, Kim’s causal 
exclusion argument represents a wonderful reductio ad absurdum of the standard ontological 
picture that has served historically as the ground-map of Western metaphysics.  The 
argument seems almost impossible to block once its basic premises are accepted and its 
logical terminus is an absurdity.  The philosopher who has to argue for the ability of a 
baseball to shatter a window is obviously starting at an ontological disadvantage.  
Fortunately, only one premise from the above needs to be outright rejected in order 
to escape the causal regress.  In particular, the notion of mereological supervenience is an 
inappropriate tool for ensuring correspondence between the physical and mental levels.  The 
model of  causation indicated in Figure 1 is the sort of  tool that will only show up as likely 
within a ground-map structured along mereological lines.   
In setting up his dilemma, Kim supposes that causation describes an external relation 
between two discrete terms.  This is the familiar billiard-ball mechanics account whereby M 
and M* are discrete, temporally sequential events that are connected by some third entity R 
(where R is a transfer of  conserved energy or what have you) and the occurrence of  M 
together with R is sufficient to determine the state of  M*.  It is this model of  causation that 
sets the gears of  the exclusion argument turning, and there is little in this account to block 
them once it is started.   
The problem with the mereological account is that it invites the same unanswerable 
question that has plagued most reductionist philosophies in one form or another – that is, 
the problem of  building quality from quantity.  We cannot doubt that there are qualities in the 
world; we experience them every conscious moment.  For this reason, one of the central 
projects for Dewey and the objective relativists was to provide an account for the primitivity 
of qualitative properties in nature.  In opposition to the reductive instincts of naïve 
materialism, the objective relativists claim that Alice and Bob’s apple really is red.   
Further motivation for rejecting the separability thesis comes from contemporary 
physics, which recognizes no such objects as the discrete atomic particulars that Kim 
describes as the inhabitants of the fundamental physical level.  Kim’s metaphysical ground-
map – his conception of  ‘physicalism’ – locates mereological constitution as the essential 
factor that uniquely determines the state of  a system.  Such an ontology requires that nature 
27 
 
be reducible to discrete particulars that, when properly arranged and related, constitute the 
furniture of  the world.  Dewey sometimes refers to this type of  ground-map as ‘mechanistic 
metaphysics.’70  Going forward, I will refer to it as naïve physicalism, to indicate both its 
intuitive appeal and its ultimate unsuitableness to contemporary theory.   
 
The Separability Thesis 
 
Probably the most famous statement of  naïve physicalism in contemporary 
metaphysics comes from David K. Lewis, under the name of  ‘Humean supervenience.’71  
According to Lewis:  
 
[A]ll there is to the world is a vast mosaic of  local matters of  particular fact, just one 
little thing and then another … we have an arrangement of  qualities.  And that is all.  
There is no difference without difference in the arrangement of  qualities.  All else 
supervenes on that.72 
 
By this view, all that exists is a spatio-temporal distribution of  isolated points or point 
particles scattered across what Lewis calls the Humean mosaic.  This is a perfect example of  
the sort of  ontology that objective relativism opposes.  In the Humean mosaic, only isolated 
components and their momentary arrangements are taken into consideration.  All powers, 
relations, and non-spatiotemporal properties are taken to supervene upon the mosaic.  
Tim Maudlin (2007) has challenged Humean supervenience upon the grounds that it 
rests upon the scientifically problematic notion of  separability.  Two systems may be said to 
be separable if  and only if  their properties may be specified without reference to one 
another.  An earlier, influential critique of  this thesis was offered by Whitehead in his 
rejection of  simple location.73  Whitehead worried that the particulate view of  physics, which 
followed Newton and Locke in conceiving of  the universe as constructed out of  discrete, 
fundamental units, had outlived its utility.  Both Maudlin and Michael Esfeld (2004) have 
argued more recently that separability is incompatible with an understanding of  the universe 
motivated by contemporary physics.74  The proof  of  this is ironically believed to have been 
inspired by separability’s most famous defender, Albert Einstein.   
Einstein and Neils Bohr had spent years engaged in public debate over the 
implications of  quantum theory.  In his famous ‘EPR paradox’ paper, Einstein insisted that 
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if  Bohr were correct about quantum theory, then the states of  any two systems could be 
correlated regardless of  distance, a process known as entanglement.75  This meant that a 
measurement of  the value of  one particle in an entangled pair would ‘instantaneously’ 
determine the value of  the other, regardless of  spatial separation.  Famously, Einstein 
insisted that no ‘complete’ physical theory would permit such ‘spooky action at a distance.’76  
 The matter stood more or less unresolved until the Scottish physicist John Bell was 
able to confirm entanglement mathematically in 1964, bringing the debate essentially to a 
close.77  Bell’s Theorem, as the result is called, demonstrates that no theory may preserve both 
locality (or the constraint of  information transfer by the speed of  light in a vacuum) and 
counterfactual definiteness (or the independent existence of  unmeasured values or ‘local 
hidden variables’).  Empirical evidence has since provided strong support for Bell’s 
conclusion.78  Most interpreters choose to preserve locality at the cost of  counterfactual 
definiteness, and thus separability.79  Bell’s Theorem, which has been called the most 
profound result in all of  physics, is often cited as the nail in the coffin of  the theory, 
sometimes known as local or classical realism, that physical events possess clearly-defined states 
independent of  their interactions or ‘measurements.’80 
 
Decoherence and Measurement 
 
For his part, Lewis admits that Bell’s Theorem might serve to falsify Humean 
supervenience.  In Einsteinian spirit, however, he chooses to withhold assent to this 
conclusion until such time as quantum physics is “purified of  supernatural tales about the 
power of  observant minds to make things jump.”81  Like Einstein before him, Lewis is 
worried about the so-called ‘measurement problem’ in quantum physics.  Very roughly, a 
quantum system is described as a wavefunction.  This wavefunction describes the temporal 
evolution of  a distribution of  states that the system could potentially occupy.  According to 
the formalism, when a system is measured, the smeared-out possibilities of  the wavefunction 
‘collapse’ into a determinate state.  The measurement problem refers to this seemingly 
miraculous intrusion of  human laboratory measurements into the transition from a quantum 
probabilistic state to an apparently classical actual state. 
There are tools available now however to frame the measurement problem that are 
less damaging to our intuitions.  One of  the most prominent is decoherence.82  The theoretical 
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physicist Wojciech Zurek describes decoherence as the process by which the “environment 
surrounding a quantum system can, in effect, monitor some of  the system’s observables.”  
To quickly flesh this out – systems are always embedded within environments.  As a result, a 
target system will always be involved in a number of  local interactions.  Each of  these 
interactions can be modeled as a binary yes/no ‘question’ that is posed to the system.  
Electrons for example are sometimes ‘bounced off ’ of  photons in a double-slit experiment 
in order to specify the location of  the photon.  The interaction of  the two particles counts 
as a ‘measurement’ of  the photon’s position.  With regard to any target system, then, there 
are any number of  such questions being posed by the system’s local environment, and each 
question counts as a measurement of  the system by the environment.   
The state of  the environment then determines what questions will be posed to a 
target system.  The distribution of  probabilities represented by the state of  the environment 
thus represents a limiting condition upon the states that the target system may occupy.  
Certain possible states of  the target system may represent a better ‘fit’ with the environment 
than other states.  States that are incompatible with one another will cancel out.  As a result, 
we consistently find that the distribution of  probabilities represented by the wavefunction 
will lose coherence as ‘unfit’ values ‘leak’ into the environment, until the target system 
‘collapses’ under environmental selection pressures into a stable, determinate state.  Zurek 
refers to this process, perhaps with tongue slightly in cheek, as ‘quantum Darwinism.’83   
In this model, there is nothing special about human measurement.  Systems ‘collapse’ 
into determinate quasi-classical states as a result of  the perfectly ordinary and explicable 
processes of  interaction, interference, and negotiation between systems and their 
environments.  In addition, this points to a view of  nature as dependent upon its relations for 
the specification of  its properties.  We do not encounter Schrödinger cat-states at the 
classical limit because the environment is always ‘measuring’ the system and ‘selecting’ in 
favor of  one state over another.  Separability, thus, fairs no better under decoherence than it 
did under Copenhagen rules.  Lewis’ model of  Humean supervenience, then, would seem to 
come out false also by the lights of  an interpretation of  quantum theory ‘purified’ of  any 
privileged role for conscious agents.  
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Composition and Configuration 
 
 Mereological supervenience is not the only model available, however.  Cunningham 
(2001) has offered a detailed account of  the ways in which the configuration of  various 
systems, as opposed to their constitution, can be sufficient to individuate them into 
emergent levels.  R.W. Sperry (1960), William C. Wimsatt (1994), Mark Bickhard and Donald 
T. Campbell (2000), and Claus Emmeche, Simo Köppe, and Frederik Stjernfelt (1997) have 
all offered contemporary models of  emergence based upon an ontology that emphasizes 
configuration over constitution, and I will follow this route as well.84  I will attempt to bring 
the voices of Dewey and the objective relativists into harmony with the configurationist 
choir by sketching the rough outline of an ontology of structure and process as opposed to 
one of classical atoms and void.  Cleansing the model of the separability thesis, and thus 
affirming a relationist ontology in accordance to McGilvary’s Maxim, is a first step in this 
analysis.   
Metaphysics, for Dewey, involves “a statement of the generic traits manifested by 
existences of all kinds.”85  He elsewhere provides an incomplete list of such traits: 
 
 Structure and process, substance and accident, matter and energy, permanence and 
 flux, one and many, continuity and discreteness, order and progress, law and liberty, 
 uniformity and growth, tradition and innovation, rational will and impelling desires, 
 proof  and discovery, the actual and the possible …86 
 
The point of this procession of opposites isn’t to provide anything like a water-tight 
categorical taxonomy.  An important structural commonality is being emphasized in each 
pairing.  In each example, we find concepts that are defined in relation to one another and 
meaningless apart.  It is thus not the individual traits that are crucial, but instead “their 
degrees and the ratios they sustain to one another.”87  Here, as elsewhere, Dewey is 
concerned with the problematic cases – the ways in which events cooperate and conflict, 
combine and transform. 
It is by virtue of  this processual nature of  events that they become structured.  
Dewey defines this co-implicative relationship in terms of the regulation of temporal 
evolution.  What differentiates structural relations from processes is their rate of  
transformation relative to one another.  “To designate the slower and the regular rhythmic 
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events structure, and more rapid and irregular ones process,” Dewey states, “is sound 
practical sense.”88 Structural events thus show up as invariant in the sense of  a horizon with 
respect to a smaller moving body.89  They provide a stable referential coordinate system 
against which localized changes are detectable.   
Structure is thus related to process as a boundary condition; it represents “an 
arrangement of  changing events such that properties which change slowly, limit and direct a 
series of  quick changes and give them an order which they do not otherwise possess.”  
Likewise, the one and the many are individuated by their contrast, the possible constrains the 
actual, and order directs and regulates progress.  These pairings do not represent 
metaphysically independent variables; they each pick out instead the terminal values of a 
relation.  They mark modes of  coordination, not distinct entities.   
It is this system-theoretic view of nature that marks Dewey’s model of emergence as 
configurational rather than compositional.  Contrary to mereological supervenience, it would 
seem that you do not get all of the properties in the world by arranging their constituents just 
so.  It is the configuration of the whole, the way its internal relations support and frustrate 
one another, rather than its mere constitution, that is relevant.  Below, I briefly summarize 
the broad-strokes of Dewey’s model before moving on to a more detailed analysis of its 
premises in the following chapters. 
 
Dewey’s Model of  Psycho-Physical Emergence 
 
Figure 2 below is meant to represent a rough approximation of  the model of  
emergence that Dewey describes.  The diagram divides into four rows with four columns.  
The rows represent the evolution of  event-types that are specific to different and 
qualitatively distinct ontological levels within an ascending hierarchy.  These should be read 
from left to right as articulating qualitatively distinct phases within a temporally unfolding 
process.  These phases are represented by the columns within the diagram.  In Chapter VI, 
a more detailed analysis of  these individual levels and phases will be provided.  For the 
moment, a few preparatory remarks should suffice. 
Each level of  functional organization within the model is fixed by two related 
factors, viz. the susceptibility of  a system to disruption by its environment and the power of  
that system to respond accordingly.  For more complex event-types, the degrees of  freedom 
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required for adjustment are greater.  As a result, different powers are necessary to maintain 
structural coherence at different levels.  Events at the psycho-physical level for example 
require more complex and subtle adjustments to maintain coherence than events at the 
physical level.  Systems lower in the hierarchy will thus tend to be more stable; they are less 
susceptible to environmental stressors and thus require fewer and simpler powers.   
 
Need Saturation
Demand
Selectivity
Satisfaction
Discrimination
Interest
Sensitivity
Anticipation Habit
Feeling
Consciousness
Culture
Signification
Mind
Objectification
Meaning
Affordance Ecology
Sensory Ecology
Dispositional Ecology
Physical System
Plants, Sedentary Organisms
Motile Organisms
Language Users
Mental
Psycho-Physical1
Physical
Psycho-Physical2
Tension Adjustment Stability
 
Figure 2. Dewey’s Model of  Psycho-Physical Emergence 
 
 
The emergence of  levels is thus correlated with the emergence of  new and more 
sophisticated powers for adjustment.   As events become more complex, they become more 
specialized and less general.  Physical events are ubiquitous, while mental events are far more 
restricted.  The division between levels represents a qualitative shift in the organizational 
complexity of  the higher-order level relative to the level below.  The levels of  functional 
organization within the model are thus structured by the quality of  their internal relations.  
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Chapter V will elaborate further upon this topic. 
The career of  any event, in Dewey’s terms, initiates within a problematic situation 
and terminates in its resolution.  At each level, the event cycle begins with a focal system 
embedded within an environment.  Two factors influence the selection of  a focal system.  
First, the focal system shows up as a point of  unstable equilibrium against a relatively stable 
and invariant background environment.  Such tensional faults are the focus of  events 
because it is at their occurrence that systems are compelled to make adjustments.  Disruption 
of  systemic stability is a precondition for something to happen.  Events are thus inherently 
problematic.  They stand out as events relative to a stable situational background because 
they put a number of  established relations at risk.  
To endure, the system must have the capacity to detect and respond appropriately to 
the forces that impinge upon it.  Events are thus always transformational, beginning with a 
state of  environmental tension, proceeding through a cycle of  adjustments, and culminating 
in a new state of  relative equilibrium that conserves the changes from the previous state and 
sets the initial parameters for the next phase of  readjustments.  Three generic phases may be 
emphasized within this process: tension, adjustment, and stability.   
Second, the quality of  prior events is carried forward into the historical development 
of  the focal event.  The degree of  fit between this conserved structure and the background 
structure of  the local environment determines the extent of  the readjustments required to 
complete that particular event-cycle.  Chapter IV will go into greater detail regarding this 
process, which is crucial to the understanding of  events as restricted relational networks and 
thus to the vindication of  the emergence model.   
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
56 Prominent examples from Dewey’s time include Alexander 1920, Broad 1925, and Morgan 
1926.  Contemporary examples include Davidson 1970, Beckermann, et. al. 1992, 
Cunningham 2001, Clayton and Davies 2006, and Corradini and O’Connor 2010. 
 
57 cf. Van Cleve 1990. 
 
58 Kim 1995 p.5. 
 
59 John Worrall (1989) warns us about the vagueness and obscurity inherent in terms like 
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‘mature physics.’ 
 
60 Kim 2005, p.149f. 
 
61 The reductions of  phlogiston and caloric to the mechanical theory of  heat is an example 
of  an arguably successful scientific reduction. 
 
62 The most famous probably being Frank Jackson’s (1982) ‘knowledge argument.’ 
 
63 At least, the standard method since Davidson 1970. 
 
64 Kim 1993, p.101f. 
 
65 See e.g. Kim 1992, 1999, 2001, 2005, and 2006.  
 
66 Alexander 1920 Vol.2, p.8.  Compare with McGilvary’s Maxim above. 
 
67 See Kim 2005, chapter 6.  Kim does not believe that qualia can be reduced to a physical 
description, and is thus committed to postulating them as an epiphenomenal ‘mental 
residue.’     
 
68 See also Walter 2008 and Crawford 2003. 
 
69 Worse, as Bertrand Russell (1912) points out, the causal profile illustrated in Figure 1 does 
not even apply at the quantum level.  Thus causation so defined is fated to drain out of  the 
world entirely. 
 
70 e.g. LW1:201. 
 
71 Although it is debatable whether Hume ever accepted such a strong position.  See Maudlin 
2007. 
 
72 Lewis 1986, p.ix. 
 
73 Whitehead 1925 p.58. 
 
74 See also D’espagnat 1989 Chapter 2, and Ladyman and Ross 2007 for additional 
scientifically-motivated argument against the separability thesis. 
 
75 i.e. a measurement of  the value of  one would ‘instantaneously’ determine the value of  the 
other, regardless of  spatial separation. 
 
76 Einstein et al. 1935.  Einstein collaborated with Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen on the 
paper, thus ‘EPR.’  See also Bohr’s response (1935). 
 
77 Bell 1964.  This brief  paragraph of  course represents a vast oversimplification of  the 
theory.    
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78 e.g. Aspect 1981. 
 
79 e.g. Aspelmeyer et. al. 2007. 
 
80 See e.g. D’espagnat 1989; Ladyman and Ross 2007; Maudlin 2007; and Esfeld 2004. 
 
81 Lewis 1986, p.xi. 
 
82 Zurek 1991, p.2002.  Also Zurek 1982 and 2003. 
 
83 Zurek 2009. 
 
84 See also Sperry 1986; Emmeche et. al. 2000; and Bickhard and Richard J. Campbell 2011. 
 
85 LW1:305. 
 
86 LW1:66f.  
 
87 LW1:309. 
 
88 LW1:64. 
 
89 cf. Gibson 1986, p.73. 
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CHAPTER IV  
HISTORIES IN THE MAKING 
  
 The objective relativists mapped the contours of  their metaphysics (arguably too 
often) by means of  destructive arguments leveled against that august philosophical artifact – 
the ontology of  stable, self-sufficient substances.  Substance, in this sense, is the primitive 
essence that underlies phenomena and that may endure independently of  any of  its apparent 
modifications.  Because substance is non-relational, however, it cannot directly interact with 
the perceiver – we can know of  it only via its powers.  Dewey (1926) and Lamprecht (1929) 
have both traced the sundering of  experience from nature back to this distinction, which was 
drawn initially by John Locke.90  Locke defined knowledge explicitly as a relation between the 
powers of  a substance and a perceiver.  But since the substance and its powers are non-
identical, it follows that we can never really know anything of  the substance itself.  We have 
in this premise the seed of  epistemological dualism, which, in the case of  Locke, takes root 
in the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.  
 Against this type of  substantivalist ontology, the objective relativists affirmed a 
conception of  nature as a dynamic system undergoing continuous evolution, adjusting and 
transforming as its various processes move in and out of harmony and tension.  One of the 
central premises that unites objective relativism as a school (however loosely) is the 
assumption of  a universe that is everywhere in process – unstable, unfinished, and 
precarious.91  ‘Things’ show up as persistent topological spikes within the flux of  interacting 
fields, but they are not ontologically fundamental.  The fundamental units of  the objective 
relativist ontology are complex and irreducible events.  The third tool borrowed from Dewey 
will thus be this ontology of  events. 
 
Histories and Situations 
 
One consequence of  such a dynamic ontology is that we are always catching the 
world in the process of  state-change.  Events, unlike substances and mereological sums, have 
duration, they take time.  We do not find the world frozen upon a knife-edge between discrete 
temporal states – one a set of  clear antecedent causes and the other a set of  distinct 
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consequent effects.  We instead find the world always as a rushing chaos of  adjustments and 
transitions, from which we may, if  needed, abstract individual causes and effects.  Events as 
such do not represent discrete space-time slices – they are as irreducibly complex from a 
temporal-historical perspective as they are from a relational-situational perspective.  
 Objective relativism thus recognizes that events occur in and are conditioned by 
their functional role within a sequential temporal history.  Dewey uses the term ‘history’ in a 
somewhat technical sense, referring to a sequence of events that retains a core of  structural 
stability throughout consecutive state changes.92  This should not imply that histories are 
somehow ‘made up’ of  atomic events however.  An event should instead be understood to 
constitute a phase of  a history that is individuated by its functional role within some wider 
situation.   
I am using the term situation here in Murphy’s sense to refer to the network of  
relations within which the event is situated.  Every event is specified relative to some 
situation and every situation is specified relative to some event.  The situation is the entire 
network of  relational deformations that ripple forth from any individual transaction.  It is all 
that is put at risk in the intersection of  a history and an environment.  The situation of  the 
book includes the table that it is on, the lamp that it is beside, etc.93   
The terms of  the relations that constitute the situation are also events – they mark 
phases within additional histories that are specified relative to the focal event.  Consider 
Murphy’s book as an example of  a focal event.  The book event is focal because it is the 
object of  our concern.  Does this introduce an element of  subjectivity into the investigation?  
No, because there is an objective network of  relations which has the book as its focus.  
There are other events in the environment that could just as easily be singled out, each of  
which is the center of  its own objective network of  relations.   
 What then fixes the state of  Murphy’s book?  The answer has already been given, at 
least in part.  The state of  the book as an event is fixed relative to both its situation and its 
history.  Every situation involves the coming together of some process of historical 
development and some network of environing relations.  The book represents the terminal 
stage of a historical sequence of events that have conserved a stable core of equilibrium 
sufficient to maintain the coherence of the generic pattern ‘book’ across any and all 
situations into which it has entered.  Histories are thus conservative – they retain an evolving 
record of their state-transitions, funded by their past transactions.  It is in the intersection of 
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this historical book-event and this present environment that limits the scope of the possible 
transactions the book may enter into.   
 
Objection: Idealism 
 
 There is a potentially troublesome consequence for an objective relativist ontology 
that is driven by the internality of  its relations.  If  every event is constituted by its 
perspectival relations, couldn’t this set in motion a vicious regress in which every individual 
event is specified by the sum of  the events that constitute its situation, and every event that 
constitutes its situation is also constituted by every event that constitutes its situation, etc.?  
The only way to halt such a regress once it has begun it seems would be to posit some 
maximal set of  relations sufficient to specify every particular event in the universe.  In other 
words, the Absolute of  the idealists. 
 Must we specify the absolute state of  the cosmos in order to specify the actual state 
of  any particular event?  No, because the total system-state, to be specified in practice, 
would need to be specified relative to a history just like any other system-state.  But this 
means that the state specified is never the total state – there must be always at least one more 
event that the state of the system is fixed relative to.  This position marks a fault line 
between functional and foundational metaphysics.  The foundationalist believes that the 
notion of a complete system-state that is specified independent of any relations is coherent.  
Rather than stipulating that the ‘true’ event is the one whose final state is fixed by the 
maximally complete set of  all possible relations (or predicates, or properties, etc.), the 
objective relativist denies that there is any sense to be found in the notion of  a ‘maximally 
complete set’ of  anything. 
 Theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli draws the same conclusion from a similar regress 
with regard to quantum systems.  Rovelli notes that physical values do not describe isolated 
physical quantities; they describe the correlations between systems.  Questions regarding the 
independent value of physical quantities are thus meaningless; the description of the world is 
exhausted by the “relative information that systems have about each other.”94  Upon this 
ground, Rovelli argues that the classical notion of an absolute or observer-dependent system-
state is conceptually incoherent.  No system-state – including any theoretical total state – is 
determined in isolation.  Any ‘absolute’ description encompassing all relations within a 
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system would itself  count as an additional relation, thus triggering the regress mentioned 
above.  Rovelli compares the status of the absolute system-state to the status of absolute 
simultaneity following relativity.  The notions are not so much wrong as strictly meaningless 
within the changed boundaries of a new scientific ground-map.95   
 Here then is how the regress of internal relations may be halted without recourse to 
the idealist’s Absolute: the specification of an event is a function of a situation, and unlike 
the promiscuous pan-relationalism of the idealists, the scope of the situations described by 
objective relativism are restricted by the concrete in-the-world transactions of historical events 
and actual environments.  It is the introduction of a focal history into an environment that 
transforms that environment into a concrete situation.  Correlatively, it is that environment 
that selects a particular event out of an evolving history.  The temporal evolution of a 
historical event and the environing relational nexus represent limiting conditions upon one 
another.  Where the two meet, the gears of possibility grind to a momentary halt in the 
actuality of the event.   
 This distinction between an internally restricted versus unrestricted relational matrix 
represents a stark distinction between objective relativism and idealism.  Objective relativists 
see constraints upon relational coherence as natural, internal factors arising out of the 
historical and situational contexts of individual systems, whereas idealists tend to take the 
total system-state to be the only legitimate constraint.  Upon the former view, constraints 
arise naturally out of the world; upon the latter, constraints must be imposed from without.  
Objective relativism is thus a more parsimonious theory than idealism; it requires nothing 
beyond what is already given in nature in order to allow for the operations of nature. 
 
Objection: Ambiguity 
 
 Lovejoy has taken forceful issue with what he considers to be the sloppy invocations 
of  the term ‘relations’ by objective relativists as an all-purpose dissolver of  philosophical 
difficulties.  Specifically, Lovejoy argues that at least three senses of  the term are regularly 
conflated: 
  
[T]he plausibility of  objective relativism … has owed a good dealt to a current 
tendency to read into the notion of  conditionality, and especially that of  
perspectivity, the logical implications of  what I have named ‘respectivity.’  It is easy 
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to confuse the proposition that an object exhibits such and such a character from the 
standpoint of  a given relatum with the proposition that it has that character 
‘relatively,’ i.e., respectively, to the same relatum.96  
 
By ‘conditionality’ Lovejoy means something like the causal relation.97  A is conditionally 
dependent upon B iff  had B not occurred, A would not have occurred.  By ‘perspectivity,’ 
Lovejoy means a relationship of  conditionality wherein the B term is the ‘percipient event’ 
of  a conscious mind.  Both of  these Lovejoy finds amenable to the existence of  sense data 
(or other sensory contents).  By ‘respectivity,’ however, Lovejoy means something more 
along the lines of  what the objective relativist means by ‘relativity,’ i.e. that a term has no 
meaning considered in isolation from its (actual or possible) relations.98  It is this third sense 
of  relativity that Lovejoy finds odious. 
 The objective relativist, says Lovejoy, generalizes the term ‘relative’ without warrant, 
conflating the sense in which any set of physical values may be specified relative to a 
reference frame with the radically different sense in which any set of sensory qualities may be 
specified relative to a conscious percipient.99  What the objective relativist means when she 
speaks of relations is the latter, perspectival sense.  And here the trap is sprung, because this 
type of perspectivity is exactly what the dualist means when he speaks of perspectives.  As 
Lovejoy frequently emphasizes, the notion of  two qualitatively distinct perspectives upon the 
‘same’ event is functionally indistinguishable from the notion of  two qualitatively dissimilar 
ideas corresponding to the ‘same’ event.  Objective relativism then collapses (as, according to 
Lovejoy, all philosophies inevitably must) into a bifurcation of objects and ideas, and thus 
into epistemic dualism.   
 There is reason to suspect that the trap is unfairly set however.  Lovejoy sees a 
categorical distinction between relations and perspectives.  The former are the children of 
nature and its causal-temporal order; the latter are the children of minds.  To someone 
setting out with Lovejoy’s ground-map, the objective relativist will seem to be speaking 
nonsense when she speaks of  perspectivity as an objective feature of  natural systems.  With 
a starting point of  ontological bifurcation, any story of  the natural emergence of  mental 
functions will appear suspect.  But it is this point precisely that the objective relativist wants 
to challenge.   
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Perspectivity 
 
 The minimal set of individuating conditions for an event includes reference to both 
(a) its functional role within a larger situational context and (b) its historical context within a 
dynamic and enduring system.  An event is thus at least the point of focus of a history 
relative to a situation.  But it is also more than this.  An event is a perspective on a situation.  It is 
this perspectival thesis that separates objective relativism most sharply from competing theories.   
Every history, as a unique system that fixes the point of focus within a wider 
environment, represents a perspective on that environment.  The event is the focal point of 
its situation, the singularity in which the networks of relations that constitutes the situation 
converge and interlock.  The corollary of this thesis is that the quality of the particular 
network of relations that constitutes the situation is specified always relative to or from the 
perspective of the focal event.  In this way, objective relativism bridges the gulf between internal 
relations and perspectives.   
Showing up from a perspective is what transforms a local network of relations into a 
situation.  If  all relations were equal, then perspectivity would be irrelevant to the 
specification of  any patterned event.  There would be no situations as we have described 
them, only an impersonal background of  fixed relations.  But not all networks are created 
equal; some localized relational webs will simply have greater weight with regard to the 
specification of  a particular event than others.  How the local environment is structured, 
including the relative weight of  various local relational networks, will directly influence the 
selection of  an event out of  an ongoing history.   
Murphy explains that an event’s “properties belong to it in relation to the world with 
which it interacts; they are at once properties of  the world and of  the center, for they are 
properties of  the world in its relation to the center.”100  An event, whatever else it may be, is 
primarily an indication of  a need for tensional adjustment.  The focus of  this internal 
tension occupies the center of  an outward-spreading network of  relations populated by 
every relata for which the event is a difference-maker.  At minimum, some otherwise-stable 
dispositional ecology must be put at risk by tensions within the event space at some vector of  
historical development if  the cycle of  tension-adjustment-stability is to first initiate.   
Already, perspectivity is built-in at this level.  This complex relationship between 
histories and relational networks ensures that any particular event will both be qualitatively 
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unique and constrained in scope by its internal structure.  It will in fact be situated within 
just this network of  relations that is eventuated by just this history.  Thus the event is 
centered, not within an impersonal network of  relations, but within a situation that is 
specifically and dynamically adapted to just that event.   
Any given relata within the situation thus realized is, from the perspective of  the 
focal event, embedded within a qualitatively unique network of  relations.  We can sharpen 
this by saying that a perspective is the quality of  a situation relative to an event.  Here the 
distinction between perspectives and relations becomes plain: perspectives fix the quality of  
networks of  relations.  They thus perform the same sort of  limiting function with regard to 
relations as structure was suggested to perform with regard to process.  Perspectivity cannot 
in such a system be explained away or rendered ‘merely apparent’; it represents a brute fact 
about the nature of events.  Perspectivity is thus not only objective but also primitive.   
 
Objections: Constancy 
 
 Lovejoy at one point attempts to draw a substantive distinction between relations 
and perspectives more in terms of the robustness of their respective relata.101  Alice, for 
example, may verify or falsify Bob’s findings regarding any physical relation by occupying 
Bob’s standpoint and seeing for herself if his measurements were accurate.  Alice cannot, 
however, verify Bob’s blue-dragon-experience by simply stepping into Bob’s vacated spatio-
temporal coordinates and running tests.  Mental events then are radically different from 
physical events in at least one way – only the latter will remain constant under repeated 
measurement. 
 But then, we are not concerned in that case with spatio-temporal perspectives 
exclusively.  It is not just the external coordinates of Bob relative to the red apple that causes 
Bob to see the blue dragon, it is the intersection of these situational factors with the 
historical trajectory of Bob up to this moment, including but not limited to the antecedent 
events conditioning Bob’s neurochemical state and Bob’s historical relationship to concepts 
like ‘apple,’ ‘dragon,’ and ‘blue.’  The entire situation comes to bear upon the determination 
of the event, and the entire history of the event as well.  It cannot, I think, be doubted that 
anyone with just that history in just that situation would have just that experience.   
 For a perspective to be objective means little more than this – any similarly 
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constituted organism embedded within a similar context when encountering similar stimuli 
would have a similar experience.  Saying that the blue dragon is ‘merely subjective’ means 
very little if it is granted that any organism for whom history H leads to neurochemical state 
N would, when embedded in system S and confronted with Stimulus X, have experience E 
where E is equivalent to a particular experience of a blue dragon.  What matters here is that 
anyone instantiating the above conditions would have exactly the same experience.  The 
situation is objectively what it is from the perspective of the event to which it is relative.  
What more than the repeatability of determinate values under identical constraints could one 
reasonably ask of objectivity?  
 
Direct Realism 
 
It is at this point that the perceptual thesis of  objective relativism may finally be 
cashed out.  The perceived apple is specified relative to the perception of  a conscious agent, 
but this is in no principled metaphysical sense different from any other relation that the 
apple may enter into.  As an event, the apple is specified as massive with regard to its 
interactions with the Higgs field; it is specified as solid with regard to other apples; and it is 
specified as red with regard to organisms that are receptive to wavelengths of  roughly 
650nm within the electromagnetic spectrum.  
To become conscious of  the red apple then is to enter into a transaction with the 
apple such that its objective qualitative properties become manifest.  There is no utility to be 
found in the assumption that events manifest their sensible properties in the absence of  
sensing agents.  Nature is not so wasteful.   
Consciousness upon this view is not a box within which marbles of  qualia may be 
kept; it is a process, a form of  behavioral response to environmental stimuli.102  This sounds 
behavioristic, and it is.  Unlike the more austere behaviorists of  their time, however, the 
objective relativists emphasized the qualitative as well as the quantitative dimensions of  
consciousness by locating qualities in the world.  The apple really is red when considered in its 
relation to visually-oriented organisms, and it is just this redness that is the object of  the 
organism’s perception.  In an objective relativist ontology, qualities do work.   
The quality of  redness thus isn’t something the apple has, it is something the apple 
does.  The apple has (or rather is) the power to do many things, and it is constantly measuring 
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and being measured by the environment to discover what things it may do.  When a network 
of  relations exists that is cooperative with regard to the apple’s dispositions to manifest the 
quality of  redness, then we are justified in saying that the apple is objectively red. 
 
Objection: Veridical Perception 
 
 If all percipient events are thus objective, in-the-world transactions, how then are we 
to evaluate between Alice’s veridical red-apple experience and Bob’s illusory blue-dragon 
experience?  The answer, in keeping with the broad pragmatic underpinnings of the 
objective relativist position, is that we evaluate the consequences of the transaction.  
Illusions and hallucinations are of course ‘real’ – there are objective, scientifically verifiable 
conditions under which they reliably occur.  But just because something objectively occurs 
that is no warrant for assuming that it represents a good tool for regulating interactions with 
the environment.  The inference from the presence of a hallucination to the conclusion that 
the object of the hallucination will sustain the same sorts of interactions as the objects of a 
veridical perception is, simply, a mistake.  The red apple will reliably survive a number of 
tests that the blue dragon will reliably fail.  What is significant in terms of knowledge is not 
which event is real, but instead the type of relational network to which the event belongs.103   
 The same holds for the traditional objection of the bent-stick-in-the-water.  Take a 
straight stick and plunge it halfway into a body of water.  Ceteris paribus, the stick will appear 
to be bent while in the water, even though it ‘really is’ unbent.  Must the objective relativist 
hold in the teeth of logic that the self-same stick has two contradictory sets of qualities, viz. 
bent-ness and straightness?104   
Of course not.  A robust body of scientific theory exists that leads us to expect 
exactly what we observe under these particular sets of constraints.  There are not two 
mutually-exclusive sets of properties co-existing in one stick; there are instead two very 
different questions that are being conflated regarding the perfectly ordinary dispositional 
properties of the same stick.  More clarity may be had by stating explicitly that the stick qua 
visual event is bent while the stick qua tactile event is unbent.  No contradiction is to be 
found here; these two statements refer to different powers of the stick to interact in different 
ways with its environment.  The stick really is bent with regard to its power to reflect light in 
combination with the power of the water to refract light and the power of human sensory 
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apparatus to register optical phenomena.  The bent-stick experience is the quality of the 
particular type of transaction that is under analysis, viz. the relation of visual perception.  
This quality does not, however, accompany the very different set of relations involved in 
tactile experience.  All of this is exactly as one should expect; interesting philosophical 
problems would only arise if the stick did not appear bent within situations in which prior 
experience and scientific theory indicated that it should. 
 
Objection: Miller-Bode 
 
 One challenge that remains to be faced at this point concerns how it may be the case 
that an event (qua phase of an evolving history) may enter into the situation (qua set of 
environmental relations) of multiple relata and yet still remain numerically singular.  Events 
are after all qualitatively unique and determinate, as Dewey is at pains to demonstrate.  
Again, consider Alice and Bob and their apple.  Bob has now sobered up and is no longer 
hallucinating dragons, so both Alice and Bob perceive a similar red apple from their 
respective standpoints.  According to the thesis of direct realism, the object of their 
perception is identical to the content of their perception; there is no intermediary bundle of 
red-apple qualia or sense data ‘inside’ the heads of Alice and Bob that ‘corresponds’ to the 
physical apple.  According to the thesis of objective relativism, the apple-event is 
conditioned by the network of relations that constitutes its situation.  For at least one of 
these relations, the relata is Alice; for at least one other, the relata is Bob.  From Alice’s 
perspective, the apple as a focal event is at the nexus of one network of relations, including 
all ‘external’ environmental and ‘internal’ neurophysical events for which the apple is a 
difference-maker, however minor or subtle.  The situation is similar from Bob’s perspective, 
only the network of relations and thus the quality of the experience is different in any 
number of subtle but significant ways.  But if Alice and Bob are involved in two dissimilar 
sets of relations which manifest two dissimilar qualitative apple-experiences, what exactly can 
the realist mean by insisting that it is the ‘same’ apple that both directly experience?   
 Some version of  this paradox devilled every direct form of  realism of  the time.  It is 
a generalized version of  the so-called Miller-Bode objection upon which James’ radical 
empiricism is sometimes thought to have broken.105  The right answer is I think given by 
Andrew Ushenko (1946).  The fact that a numerically singular object may feature in two 
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qualitatively distinct fields of perception loses its air of contradiction if, instead of puzzling 
over how a complex of manifest properties may be so duplicated, we instead cash out the 
object in terms of a complex of powers or dispositions to interact with other events in a set 
variety of ways, some of which are manifest in perceptual relations.106  The object qua cluster 
of powers is then common to both observers, even though the specific qualities manifested 
are objectively relative to the individual percipient events.  This notion is touched upon in 
Dewey and McGilvary as well, where the terms of  relations are taken to be terminal of  a 
process.  Perceptual qualities, being the terminal phase of  a consummated event, represent 
the manifestation of  what was until then only a potentiality.107   
 This should hold regardless of the temporal duration of the event.  Let’s say that 
Alice is sick of staring at apples all of the time and decides to go outside for a bit of 
stargazing.  According to the thesis of direct realism, the object of Alice’s perceptual 
experience (the star) should be directly present in that experience.  But, after checking 
Wikipedia, Alice discovers that the exact star that she was gazing at became extinct a 
thousand years ago.  How then can it be that Alice’s experience of the star is identical to the 
star itself, if the star no longer exists when the experience occurs.  Lovejoy treats such an 
example as his knock-out punch, and it can indeed wreak devastation upon neo-realism.108   
 Here as well though Ushenko has an answer.  The exercise of a particular power may 
be reasonably thought to be a temporally extended process that initiates at t1 and terminates 
at t2 and this should hold true regardless of the values of t1 and t2.  The star perceived by Alice 
may be said to be the same star that burned a thousand years ago because it is the powers of 
the star and their exercise, not some separate underlying essence, that the term ‘star’ picks 
out.  With no concept of substance within this ontology, the identity of an event is 
exhausted by its powers to interact with other events.  There is thus for Ushenko nothing 
‘underneath’ the causal powers of the star that may fail to show up in percipient events.  
Without motivation to distinguish between the power of a star and its essence, Ushenko has 
no reason to deny that the star is directly present in experience. 
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CHAPTER V  
THE GEARS OF POSSIBILITY 
 
 Every relation is in one sense perspectival because all relations flow from one relata 
to another.  In this way the interrelated web of  relations that constitutes a particular situation 
achieves a relatively stable coherence that fixes the focal event and allows it to persist 
through time.  An event may thus be understood as the nexus of  a coherent network of  
relations that is evolving along a relatively stable historical vector.   
 To draw a visual analogy, consider the event as the center ring of  a gear, for which 
each of  its relations serve as teeth.  Each of  these teeth is, in a sense, ‘for’ the grooves of  
another gear – it will ‘fit’ with that sort of  groove and no other.  Similar for the grooves of  
the gear – each is adapted to receive a certain type of  tooth.  When fit is achieved between 
gears, the ingredients for stability are present.  There is a degree of  directedness here, a 
functional for-ness that characterizes each tooth and groove as the one that it is.   Events are 
like this as well.  For each event, there exists some set of  events for which it is a good fit and 
some set for which it is not.   
 As the hub of  a relational network, an event is directed in any number of  directions 
at any given time.  It has an objective potential to transact in certain predictable ways with 
other events.  This potential may be satisfied or frustrated in any number of  ways, depending 
upon other factors in its environment.  These additional factors are of  course further events, 
and they also point to potential satisfactions and frustrations.  There is, in other words, a 
primitive modality to events – they may eventuate, inhibit, necessitate, or cancel any number 
of  possible outcomes.   
 There is a term for such an objective modality, one reaching back at least to Aristotle 
and well-known to Locke, though it had fallen out of  academic fashion by the time the 
objective relativists were writing.  That word is power, and it is the powerful, directed nature of  
events that bridges the gap between relations and perspectives.  The present chapter will thus 
concern the role of  power within an objective relativist ontology. 
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Dispositions 
 
More needs to be said about what it means for a property to be powerful.  A typical 
example of  a dispositional property is the fragility of  glass.  Let’s say that a baseball is hurtling 
towards a window.  If  enough force is behind the ball when it strikes the window, we expect 
the window to shatter.  This is because the glass that constitutes the widow is fragile; it has 
the persistent tendency to interact in a certain way with other events (i.e. to shatter when 
struck appropriately).  We want to say that this disposition to shatter under certain 
constraints represents a fact about the glass.  Further, if  the glass is never struck in this 
particular manner, and therefore never shatters, we still want to say that the glass is fragile 
(no one assumes that windows are not fragile until they are struck).  Dispositions thus 
indicate objective facts that are thought to be metaphysically independent of  their 
manifestations.   
Ushenko was the first to explicitly link objective relativism with an ontology of  
power.  This is in a sense surprising – the emphasis of  objective relativism upon the dynamic 
attributes of  events lends itself  far easier to a powerful universe than to one that is strictly 
passive and powerless.  There was however a general reluctance during this period even 
among objective relativists to explicitly introduce powers into ontology.  There has in general 
been a tendency among post-Humean philosophers to regard dispositional properties as 
somehow mysterious, while so-called ‘categorical’ properties – typically defined as non-
dispositional and causally inert qualities such as shape or configuration – are regarded as 
ontologically basic.  Dispositions, as D.H. Mellor colorfully describes the situation, have been 
thought to be “as shameful … as pregnant spinsters used to be – ideally to be explained 
away, or entitled by a shotgun wedding to take the name of  some decent categorical 
property.”109   
To be ontologically respectable, dispositions, it was thought, must be regarded as 
higher-order properties, which supervene upon or are in some sense realized by an 
underlying substrata of  discrete, non-powerful bits of  matter.110  The standard method for 
attempting to make dispositions ontologically respectable was by means of a conditional 
analysis.  The simplest form is a non-material conditional that for a disposition D specifies a 
stimulus condition S in the antecedent and a manifestation condition M in the consequent.  
Formally, the schema is ∀x (Dx ↔ (Sx → Mx)).  The window (x) is fragile (D) iff  being 
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struck appropriately (S) causes it to shatter (M).  If  this analysis holds, then it should be 
possible to analyze dispositions in terms of  purely categorical properties.   
But the conditional analysis has been abandoned by an increasing number of 
philosophers because of its apparent vulnerability to a number of potential interferers.111  As 
C.B. Martin,112 Alexander Bird,113 and Mark Johnston114 have all independently pointed out, 
there are a number of hypothetical situations in which the disposition may exist without the 
associated conditional being true, because of some factor that interferes with the outcome at 
a key juncture.  The most common example is Martin’s electro-fink, a hypothetical device that 
removes the disposition of a wire to conduct electricity, but only upon the realization of the 
condition of that disposition’s manifestation.115  Thus the conditional is false (the presence 
of the fink ensures that the manifestation does not occur), even though the wire genuinely 
possesses the disposition.116 
Another factor that has led some to be suspicious of  attempts to ground powers in a 
non-power base is the worry that a purely categorical ontology would necessarily involve 
quiddities.117  A quiddity is the primitive essence or ‘what-ness’ of  a thing that is supposed to 
necessarily ground it as the type of  thing that it is independent of  its causal or relational 
qualities.  Quiddities have not enjoyed great popularity in contemporary metaphysics, largely 
because they are by definition undetectable and thus methodologically otiose.118  
Extrapolated to a discussion of  powers, the argument suggests that any purely categorical 
properties would be, by definition, unable to affect any changes upon the world.  Against the 
prevailing Humean wisdom, it seems that such powerless qualities are in fact quite a bit more 
mysterious than dispositions, by virtue of  the fact that they are essentially inert, passive, and 
undetectable.   
Since quiddities are defined by their lack of  a causal profile, the rejection of  
quiddities is equivalent to the rejection of  any property that lacks causal relevance.  For the 
moment, I am employing the term ‘causal relevance’ in a non-technical and inclusive sense to 
include any property that makes a difference with regard to any other property.119  We should 
thus, in accordance with the rejection of  quiddities, as well as the constraints of  McGilvary’s 
Maxim and Alexander’s Dictum, be prepared to cast out anything from our ontologies that 
cannot be shown to make some difference in the world.  Purely categorical properties, by 
definition, are thereby excluded.  The only properties that we can responsibly assert to exist 
are thus powerful. 
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Qualities 
 
If  dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties, then is the 
reverse true?  Can categorical properties such as structure and organization be reduced to 
purely quantitative accounts of  physical dispositionality?  There are many who have recently 
suggested that this is the case, a position that is sometimes called pandispositionalism.120  
Others are more skeptical of  this approach, and its seeming reduction of  all qualities to 
quantitative dispositional vectors.121 
It is this latter sort of  worry that I suspect lies behind Dewey’s occasional tendency 
to disparage Lockean powers as ‘mysterious’ and to suggest that Locke’s nascent relationism 
would be better served by analyzing physical power in more Humean terms of  an “orderly 
seriality among events.”122  While this approach is in general accord with Dewey’s 
structuralist tendencies, it is difficult to square with his emergentism, which identifies 
emergent levels with the release of  new potentialities, and thus with the natural emergence 
of  a genuinely physical modality.   
Elsewhere, Dewey indicates that such reluctance may be influenced by deeper 
concerns about the ontological status of  qualities.  Dewey insists that “in every event there is 
something obdurate, self-sufficient, wholly immediate, neither a relation nor an element in a 
relational whole, but terminal and exclusive.”123  This statement is however in tension with 
Dewey’s insistence, in another passage within the same book, that events cannot be 
characterized “independently of a relation to others.”124  Raymond Boisvert defends Dewey 
upon this point, arguing that there is “a very real sense in which forms can be considered 
atemporal” because “the ontological status of  forms is that of  possibilities” rather than 
temporally conditioned events.125  Thus events acquire form through their temporal relations, 
but the forms they acquire are atemporal and absolute.  This brings Dewey’s notion of  form 
closer to the notion of  ‘eternal objects’ central to the later Whitehead.126 
I find this reading difficult to reconcile with Dewey’s generally pragmatic suspicion 
of  absolutes, however.  McGilvary is also puzzled by Dewey’s meaning here, musing that the 
“belief  that anything has absolute, i.e., non-relational, characters … is so inveterate” that 
even someone like Dewey “who in general has no use for absolutes of  any kind” seems to 
habitually cling “to absolutes of  this kind.”127  McGilvary it seems to me has the right of  the 
matter.  The removal of  form and possibility from the temporal order and thus from the 
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natural world lends a sense of  abstractness to Dewey’s ontology.  I prefer to keep Dewey more 
thoroughly naturalistic by simply ceding this point to McGilvary and treating structure, 
quality, and modality as temporally-conditioned citizens of  the natural order. 
How then should we speak about qualities?  According to Dewey, the qualities of  
events register “those ultimate differences in affairs which mark them off from one another 
and give them discreteness.”128  Qualities are thus formal – they represent the contours of 
events that structure and regulate their temporal evolution.  Qualities may then be taken to 
represent a limiting condition upon relations in the same sense that structure represents the 
limiting condition upon process.  Events upon this view are the quality of  their relations.  
The terms are co-implicative – you cannot have unrelated qualities or unqualified relations.  
Events will show up as qualitative when modeled one way (e.g. as sense data or qualia) and 
relational when modeled another (e.g. as correlations between behaviors and neural activity), 
but they cannot be abstracted without remainder complex and concrete events.  The case for 
their distinction is pragmatic, not metaphysical. 
 This preserves a realistic and naturalistic reading of  both the categorical and 
qualitative aspects of  events and their causal and dispositional aspects.  Both represent real 
patterns displayed by events, and as such may be isolated and abstracted for the purposes of  
analysis, explanation, and prediction.  There is a contemporary version of  dispositional 
realism that explicitly endorses a view such as this – the ‘identity theory’ or ‘limit view’ of  
C.B. Martin and John Heil.129  Martin and Heil treat categorical and dispositional 
designations as making sense only relative to one another, and thus as alternate descriptions 
of  the same event.  Martin visualizes this by reference to the famous ‘duck-rabbit’ drawing, 
which may resemble either animal depending upon the conditions of  viewing.130   
This position has sometimes been criticized as obscure, but Dewey’s understanding 
of  structure and process I think provides good tools for making sense of  the claim.  The 
relevance of  qualities is to be found in the structural and thus regulatory function they 
perform with regard to powers and relations.  This qualitative character is what brings 
relations into some form of  stable coherence that marks off  the contours of  one event from 
any other.  The quality of  an event is thus not merely a vector sum of  the dispositions that it 
may be analyzed into.  Events are irreducible in the sense that the specific qualities that 
characterize any single event are destroyed by attempts to reduce it to an aggregate of  
component parts or properties.  We are thus closer to the crisis of  the event when we speak 
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of  ‘powerful qualities,’ than when we treat the terms as ontologically separable.131 
 
Objection: Intrinsicness 
 
 There is a potential problem for the objective relativist who incorporates powers into 
her ontology, however.  As noted above, part of  the definition of  a disposition is that it is a 
property that exists even if  its manifestation conditions never occur.  A window, for 
example, may be fragile even if  it should never be struck in the right sort of  way to make it 
shatter.  This has led many philosophers to regard dispositions as necessarily intrinsic 
properties.  Intrinsic properties are by definition non-relational, they persist independent of  
environmental changes.  Many philosophers have thus argued that powers cannot be 
relational.132  Relations (such as the causal relation) may supervene upon powers, but the 
powers themselves are intrinsic and essential.   
 There is not universal assent upon this point however.133  Jennifer McKitrick (2003) 
notes that at the very least some dispositions may be specified relationally.  While the property 
of  having a certain mass m might be intrinsic, the property of  having a certain weight w is 
certainly extrinsic: “A person’s weight on earth is different than her weight on the moon … a 
different gravitational field becomes local, and so her weight changes.”134  L.W. Beck (1952) 
interprets this same fact regarding the relational specification of  weight as evidence 
supporting the objective relativism of  properties in general.  But if  the fact that weight is a 
function of  interactions involving a gravitational field is enough to establish the relational 
status of  that property, then why should mass be thought of  differently?  The standard 
model of  particle physics suggests that the property of  mass is a function of  interactions 
involving the Higgs boson, which is itself  less a particle in the classical sense than a 
quantized fluctuation within the omnipresent Higgs field.  Mass, then, seems just as much a 
relation upon this criterion as weight if  contemporary physics is to be consulted on the 
matter.   
 Still, if  a power is able to exist independent of  its manifestation, this is potentially 
troubling for a relationist ontology.  There is reason to suppose that this conclusion is based 
upon an over-simplified conception of  the operation of  powers.  Martin (2008), for 
example, admits that: 
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I have been talking as if  a disposition exists unmanifested until a set of  background 
conditions is met, resulting in manifestation.  This picture is misleading, however, 
because so-called background conditions are every bit as operative as the identified 
dispositional entity.  A more accurate view is one of  a huge group of  dispositional 
entities or properties which, when they come together, mutually manifest the property 
in question; talk of  background conditions ceases, replaced by talk of  power nets.135  
  
Mumford and Anjum (2011) expand this mutual manifestation model by incorporating 
George Molnar’s observation that powers are ‘polygenic’ – that is, a manifestation is the 
result not of  the operation of  a single power in isolation, but of  the coming together of  
many powers that mutually reinforce or inhibit the exercise of  any individual power.136  
Powers, upon this view, are always operative and thus are never in the mysterious state that 
the intrinsicness thesis seems to require wherein a power seemingly chooses to refrain from 
doing any work until its preferred manifestation partner appears.  Dispositions, as Nancy 
Cartwright (1999) puts it, are always “trying” to manifest, but may be prevented by the 
distribution of  additional dispositions that constitutes their local environment or situation.137 
 Powers, from an objective relativist standpoint, do not exist in a vacuum.  They are 
always interacting, even if  their function within a given relation is simply to support or 
inhibit another disposition.  This stance also has a contemporary analog in the position 
sometimes referred to as power structuralism, which assimilates the powerful properties of  the 
dispositional realist into the thoroughly relational ontology of  the structural realist.138   
 
Event Space 
 
 The metaphysical ground-map of the objective relativist is, ultimately, a map of the 
qualitative contours that mark the more stable and persistent relational networks.  What the 
map charts is the province of criticism, the landscape that is available for inquiry.  In this 
sense, the lines on the metaphysical ground-map are equivalent to the moves that are 
available within a particularly large and mostly stable event space. 
 A bit of abstraction may be useful going forward.  Let’s consider an event in 
isolation from all relations.  For the sake of argument we will say that, instead of being 
powerless and unreal, such an unrelated event would by virtue of its lack of contextual 
constraints be analyzable as an unrestricted bundle of dispositions.  Such a system would be 
disposed in all directions at once, and, as a result, in no direction in particular.  It would be 
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pure, unrestricted potentiality, and as such could not become manifest as any particular 
actuality. 
 This unrestricted potentiality could be mapped onto an idealized event space that 
imagines potential states of a target system as ‘moves’ available within a geometrical state-
space.  An event space in this sense is similar in function to the notion of a quality space that 
is employed by Mumford and Anjum (2011) for the analysis of causation.139  Consider 
Figure 3 below.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mumford and Anjum’s Model of  a Quality Space140 
 
 
The background represents the quality space against which events show up as changes of  
value in one direction or the other, with F and G representing the opposing directions of  
adjustment.  The arrows represent dispositional vectors disposing toward either F or G.  
When enough dispositional vectors dispose towards a certain outcome (and are not cancelled 
by vectors disposing towards the opposite outcome), a threshold (T) is reached, and a result 
(R) occurs.  One strength of  this model is that it provides a clear way to visualize the 
complex and sometimes inhibitory relations between large numbers of  dispositions.  
 An event space should be understood to represent an idealized model specifying the 
potential states available for a system to enact as a result of its transactions.  Applied to our 
idealized unrestricted system, any particular dispositional vector within the event space 
would be counter-balanced by a contravening dispositional vector in the opposite direction, 
resulting in a system that was in a state of perfect, static equilibrium.  A system wherein 
every potential move within its event space is blocked is in a state that Dewey calls 
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saturation.141  In order for some degrees of freedom to be available for change, there have to 
be some specifiable constraints upon the system that restrict its adjustment potential.   
 This is why the historical and situational facts about the system are key to its 
individuation – they constrain and thus unsettle the event space allowing for the system to 
undergo specifiable adjustments.  Every history, as remarked earlier, carries the scars of its 
prior situations.  It thus brings a unique qualitative profile to its situation. 
 Our hypothetical system has, by virtue of its unrestricted dispositional potential, the 
capacity to manifest any possible value.  For any environment that it could enter into, 
however, there will be some values that are more likely to register than others, and even 
some values that are strictly forbidden.  The reason for this is that an environment is the 
coherent result of the interplay of multiple restricted systems, each bringing its own 
dispositional ecology to bear upon the determination of the whole.  The environment thus 
constitutes a relatively stable dispositional ecology that will tend to either frustrate or support 
the introduction of a new system, depending upon its historical patterns and powers. 
 
Modal Interference 
 
 For the purposes of this model, there seem to be at least four ways in which the 
dispositions of our idealized unrestricted system could succeed or fail to be integrated into 
an existing dispositional ecology.  First, some dispositions could strongly reinforce the 
preexisting patterns of dispositions in the ecology and would thus be strengthened or 
amplified by their new environing context.  To pick a down-to-earth example, the preexisting 
disposition of a hydrophobic person towards elevated stress levels may be easily amplified 
via relocation to the middle of the ocean.  Amplification enhances dispositions within both 
the focal system and any systems in the environment with which it achieves some degree of  
fit.  A loose analogy can be made with the process of  constructive interference in wave 
mechanics.  Consider the meeting of  two transverse waves of  identical frequency.  The crests 
and troughs of  the two waves would become superposed, resulting in a combined 
displacement magnitude equal to the vector sum of  their individual magnitudes.  While it is 
debatable how closely such a vector sum model resembles the actual interactions of  
dispositions, the visual component is at least helpful.142 
 A disposition however that weakly interferes with a coherent network of  preexisting 
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dispositions would likely be inhibited, its impact greatly dampened by its environment.  The 
disposition of  a glass to shatter for example will decrease proportionately as the glass 
approaches the center of  an active volcano and begins to melt.  Networks of  dispositions 
that are inhibited by their environment would tend to become unstable and thus to undergo 
some form of  transformation or adjustment in order to better cohere with their local 
ecology.  In the tensional push-pull between a given system and a wider and more stable 
ecology, it is the relatively unstable newcomer who is likely to give more ground, although 
both system and environment are altered by the transaction.   
 Selective pressures within the local ecology may thus enforce catastrophic 
deformations within the event space of  the target system as it adjusts and becomes 
ultimately normalized as a part of  the environmental background.143  If  the dispositions of  the 
new system are strongly destructive to the local dispositional ecology, however, they are then 
subject to potential cancellation by inhibitory dispositional networks of  equivalent strength.  
Returning to the wave mechanics analogy, imagine that the frequency of  one of  the two 
waves is inverted so that for every crest of  the one there is a matching trough for the other, 
thus annihilating the signal. 
 Dispositions in the ecology that tend towards inhibition or cancellation with regard 
to a focal system may be considered competitive dispositional partners; those that tend towards 
amplification and normalization may be considered cooperative.  Where there is cooperation, 
the dispositions of  the focal system may achieve manifestation; where there is competition, 
manifestation will be to some extend frustrated.  By the negotiation and mutual adjustment 
of  competitive and cooperative dispositional networks, the core structural integrity of  an 
environment is conserved throughout the unfolding cataclysm of  an ongoing event.   
 The structure of  our idealized unrestrictive system will of  course have been 
drastically altered via its integration into such an environment.  Granting that some among 
its unrestricted set of  dispositions would become normalized or amplified, a far larger set 
would become either screened off  entirely via cancellation or integrated in far weaker form 
via inhibition.  As a result, the system would become reorganized into a new historical 
pattern as a result of  these transformations.  The changes undergone by the system would 
be carried forward into its next cycle of  tensional readjustments, and so on for the structure 
that is conserved after that transaction and the next, resulting in a continuous sequence of  
qualitative deformations of  the system’s event space relative to its conserved historical 
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structure.   
 The environment is similarly, though less catastrophically, altered by individual 
events.  This is because both the target system and its environmental background each enter 
into the transaction with a particular dispositional profile, and thus with a qualitatively 
distinct event space.144  The dispositions of  each system to interact in some way or another 
with other systems map directly onto the degrees of  freedom in each event space.  To 
individuate, we may call the event space of  the target system the historical event space and 
the event space of  the environment the situational event space.  It is in the coming together 
of  a historical and a situational event space that the mechanisms of  modal interference 
become operative.  This is because the values normalized or cancelled in this process are 
states that each system could potentially occupy.   
 The resulting outcome state produced by the interaction of  our two idealized 
systems is a function of  the degree of  fit that holds between the full arsenal of  dispositions 
that define each system.  Where that fit is destructive (i.e. where inhibitions and cancellations 
occur), we will find a reduction of  the combined event spaces.  Where the fit is constructive 
(i.e. where amplifications and normalizations occur), we will instead find a stabilization of  
those dispositions that are mutually reinforcing.  The result, to draw a terminological analogy 
to a familiar physical process, is that the environmentally-induced decoherence of  the relative 
event spaces triggers a ‘collapse’ of  the unrestricted event space of  our idealized system and 
the event space of  the local dispositional ecology into a single coherent event space.  Call 
this idealized process modal interference if  it must have a name and call the resulting event 
space the quality of  the situation. 
 
Modal Decay 
 
 The current section has been concerned largely with the employment of  abstract, 
visually-oriented models in an attempt, inspired in part by Dewey’s conception of  
metaphysical theories as ground-maps, to bring a few of  the ideas introduced in previous 
chapters together into a relatively coherent model.  The map is not the territory however, 
and it bears repeating that systems, event spaces, dispositions, and relations have meaning 
only as patterns that may be isolated within the concrete events that we discover in the 
world.  Once discovered, of  course, these patterns may then be turned back upon that world 
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as tools for targeted analysis.   
 Consider for example the problem of  causal exclusion described in Chapter III.  
Kim’s model of  causation assumes a fairly intuitive notion of  causation as a relation between 
two discrete terms that is sufficient to determine the state of  the latter.  Such an account 
only makes sense upon an assumption that a principled ontological distinction exists 
between intrinsic properties and their extrinsic relations.  Once again we find a dualism at the 
heart of  a confusion.  From the point of  view of  objective relativism, a different model of  
causation seems plausible however.   
Above, the quality of  an event was identified with the structure of  its event space in 
the following way.  First, the complex dynamical structure of  events was analyzed in terms 
of  the interaction of  various dispositions (and networks of  dispositions).  These dispositions 
were then further abstracted onto an event space defined by the set of  possible states that 
the event could dispose towards.   
From here it is just a matter of  letting the event space decohere as a result of  the 
modal interference created by the interplay of  cooperative and competitive dispositional 
networks.  The outcome will be the collapse of  a distribution of  potential outcomes (as 
indicated by the event space) into a single determinate state.  This may thus be called the 
modal decay or the causation as collapse account, whereby C and E are boundary conditions 
established at the initiation and completion of  a process that is characterized by the ongoing 
reduction of  the set of  potential values of  Ep and that is sufficient (over time) to determine 
the actual state of  Ea.  A less formal way of  putting this would be: an event is sufficiently 
caused when every factor preventing its occurrence has been removed.  Even better: 
causation is the collapse of  possible futures.   
 An attempt at visualizing the modal decay model is made in Figure 4 below:  In this 
illustration, two vectors are used to represent the intersection of  the historical and situational 
dimensions of  an event.145  The vertical (symmetrical) vector represents the network of  
relations that constitutes an event’s situation; the horizontal (asymmetrical) vector represents 
its temporal-historical trajectory.  The dotted lines tapering away from the poles of  the 
situational vector to converge at the leading historical edge are meant to convey the collapse 
of  the historical and situational event spaces into an actual qualitative event.  The three-
dimensional rendering on the right is meant to bring home more vividly the fact that what is 
collapsing in this model is the dynamic, structured ecology of  objective possibilities for 
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further transactions that is opened relative to any event.  The manifestation of  any single 
property thus represents the annihilation of  everything else that could have been the case in 
the pitiless, roiling furnace of  the event.   
 
History
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
 
Figure 4. The Modal Decay Model 
 
 
 The conjecture is that this process is occurring all the time.146  Event spaces are 
abstractions employed for analytical purposes.  What is concrete is the actual event, with its 
regulating structural quality that is perpetually shifting, responding and adapting to 
environing conditions as its various powers for adjustment move in and out of  inhibition, 
cancellation, and normalization.  In a sense, the evolution of  a history is the conservative 
record of  a slowly-unfolding catastrophe.  The quality of  an event bears the scars of  a 
hundred conflicts, and testifies to the resilience of  the structure that has been conserved. 
Kim’s dilemma of  the exclusion of  higher-order events by their lower order base 
does not emerge in this model, because the higher-order events here represent boundary 
conditions that help determine which of  the potential lower-order properties will be 
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frustrated and which will manifest.  This process does not involve downward causation in 
any robust sense, because the terms in the causal sequence are not mediated by any external 
relation; they are instead related internally by their relative configurational dynamics.  This 
model thus replaces the problematic asymmetrical mereological supervenience of  Kim’s 
model with a symmetrical relation in which both levels operate as agent and patient relative 
to one another.  Inter-level causation thus takes the form of  an ongoing process of  mutual 
negotiation between levels, rather than the discrete transfer of  an external causal ‘force.’   
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CHAPTER VI 
DEWEY’S MODEL OF EMERGENCE 
 
 The objective relativists believed that, if  the proper metaphysical tools could be 
crafted to demonstrate how the traits typically associated with mental events – perspectivity, 
intentionality, qualitative experience, meaning, etc. – could emerge organically within natural 
systems, then a lion’s share of  the ontological work towards reconciling experience with 
nature would be accomplished.  The previous two chapters have been primarily concerned 
with the grounding of  perspectivity and quality, and the present chapter will touch briefly 
upon the topics of  intentionality and meaning.  Accordingly, while the previous chapters 
have dealt largely with defining the contours of  the wider metaphysical ground-map within 
which Dewey’s emergence model is embedded, this final chapter will turn from such broad 
metaphysical mappings to more targeted forms of  ontological modeling.  As such, we will 
examine the anatomy of  the event cycles that constitute the qualitative levels in Dewey’s 
model of  emergence. 
 Dewey’s method here emphasizes the tools and processes that are involved in the 
transformation of  nature’s ungoverned events into culture’s stable and beneficial objects.  
This, as Dewey points out, is an essentially critical endeavor.  We regulate the course of  
events in conformity with the value we place upon their outcomes.  The ability to recognize, 
evaluate, and thus regulate the course of  events is crucial to our survival and success as a 
species.  By taking note of  the correlations that hold between antecedents and outcomes 
under certain sets of  constraints we can get a fix on the ways in which natural systems tend 
to behave.  In fortuitous circumstances, we can even learn to redirect their course.  The 
intelligent organism will thus take heed to regulate its dispositional ecology so that beneficial 
patterns will tend to stabilize.  If  this process is carried out continuously and systematically, 
these patterns may become objectified into regulative structures that will serve to mark the 
path for future events.   
 Part of  Dewey’s naturalistic project is thus the demonstration that this evaluative 
function is continuous with the activities of  nature at all levels, and thus to locate a place for 
objective value.  Dewey progresses farther in this task than anyone could reasonably expect.  
Alas, it is not quite far enough.  The mental level in particular is problematic for Dewey’s 
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model, primarily because of his insistence that meaning be uniquely tied to the use of 
language.  As a result, I will be introducing a few new tools into the discussion, borrowed 
from the ecological theory of perception formulated by James J. Gibson (1986), that were 
not yet available during the time that Dewey and the other objective relativists were writing.  
A line of continuity exists however – Gibson’s teacher was E.B. Holt, the neo-realist.  Holt’s 
teacher, of course, was William James.147   
 
The Physical Level 
 
Consider Figure 5 below:  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Physical Level 
 
 
The necessary set of  antecedent conditions for the initiation of  an event at the 
physical level includes at minimum a relatively coherent physical system S in a state of  
unstable equilibrium relative to its local dispositional ecology E.  The instability of  S 
compels it toward a state of  structural readjustment.  The degrees of  freedom available for 
any readjustment are limited by E.  The negotiations between S and E to determine optimal 
fit trigger the collapse of  all unfit potential values for S.  The process terminates when only 
those values that achieve optimal fit remain, reducing the adjustment potential and saturating 
the event space.   
For events at the physical level, the adjustment phase is characterized by a need-
demand-saturation cycle.  In Dewey’s words: 
 
By need is meant a condition of  tensional distribution of  energies such that the body 
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is in a condition of  uneasy or unstable equilibrium.  By demand or effort is meant 
the fact that this state is manifested in movements which modify environing bodies 
in ways which react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of  active 
equilibrium is restored.  By satisfaction is meant this recovery of  equilibrium due to 
interactions with the active demands of  the organism.148 
 
Note Dewey’s use of  the term satisfaction in the above.  The difference between satisfaction 
and saturation is that the latter points to the neutrality of  purely physical systems with regard 
to state.  “Iron as such exhibits characteristics of  bias or selective reactions, but it shows no 
bias in favor of  remaining simple iron.”149  Satisfaction, by contrast refers to living systems 
which have a vested interest in maintaining a level of  persistent structural integrity.  Dewey is 
unfortunately not always consistent with this usage however.  In the interest of  clarity, I will 
refer to the need-demand-selectivity-saturation cycle in relation to physical systems, and the more 
explicit interest-discrimination-sensitivity-satisfaction circuit in relation to psycho-physical systems.  
One justification for this is that interest and discrimination are invoked only in relation to 
psycho-physical systems.  Thus these properties would seem to represent genuine qualitative 
distinctions between the powers of  physical and psycho-physical systems.  
A physical event begins with S in a state of  tension with regard to E.  There is thus 
an objective need for the system to adjust to its environment if  it is to achieve the level of  
coherent fit necessary to conserve its historical pattern.  Since the event space for adjustment 
is set by the coupling of  system-and-environment, any adjustments by S place demands upon 
E, which responds by reciprocally adjusting to changes within S.  These demands initiate a 
process of  ongoing feedback between S and E, each of  which responds selectively to the 
demands placed upon it in a manner consistent with its dispositional structure.  It is this 
steady cooperative negotiation of  the boundaries of  the localized event space established by 
the push-pull of  S moving against E that characterizes the adjustment phase of  an event.  If  
these negotiations involve transactions between conflicting powers, then the available 
degrees of  freedom will begin to decohere.  This process terminates when the event space 
ultimately becomes saturated and S is returned to a state of  stabilized equilibrium with regard 
to E. 
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Intentionality 
 
 Within the context of  Dewey’s objective relativist ontology, it makes sense to speak 
of  elementary particles as showing “a selective bias in their indifferencies, affinities and 
repulsions.”150  This statement, properly contextualized, merely notes the modal or 
dispositional character of  events, the fact that they tend towards some interactions and not 
others.  Dewey’s decision to reappropriate the vocabulary of  folk psychology (e.g. bias, 
indifferencies, affinities) to describe events at the physical level is meant to underscore the 
continuity between higher-level intentional functions and lower-level physical dispositionality.  
This point seems less controversial now, with a robust metaphysics of  dispositions in place 
to support it, than it did when Dewey was writing.  At the time, it looked like panpsychism 
dressed up in neo-Darwinian garb. 
 There is now a growing consensus around the grounding of  the directedness of  
intentionality in the dispositionality of  physical systems.151  An intentional state is a state that 
points beyond itself  – it is about some other object or property.  My belief  that Barack 
Obama is the president of  the United States is a paradigmatic example of  an intentional 
property.  This has generally been taken by philosophers to be a distinctly mental property 
that has no analog in non-mental systems, leading some to declare that the intentional is the 
mark of  the mental.152  But, as George Molnar (2007) points out, the salient fact about a 
disposition is that it also is directed at something that is not itself, namely, its manifestation.   
 As Molnar notes, it seems that every criteria that may be invoked to fix the identity 
of  intentional states may also be used to fix the identity of  dispositional properties.  If  
correct, this is sufficient to establish an identity between the concepts.  Molnar concludes on 
this ground that intentionality is the mark of  the dispositional, rather than the mental.  
Mumford and Anjum (2011) however suggest that a commitment to naturalism instead 
supports an analysis of  intentionality in terms of  dispositionality.153  This brings their view 
closer to Dewey’s emergence model.  Rather than locating a primitive intentionality within 
nature, and thus courting panpsychism, Dewey treats higher-order intentional states as more 
complex instantiations of  lower-order physical dispositionality.  Dispositionality and 
intentionality are thus evidence of  a generic structural continuity within natural systems that 
cuts across the various levels, but they do not represent qualitatively identical event-types.   
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The Psycho-Physical1 Level 
 
The psycho-physical1 level, represented by Figure 6 below, is the second level in 
Dewey’s emergence model and the first to actually emerge from a lower level.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. The Psycho-Physical1 Level 
 
 
Dewey uses terms like ‘psycho-physical’ and ‘body-mind’ to draw attention to the natural 
continuity between physical systems and sentient organisms.  In his model, Dewey defines 
the psycho-physical level coarsely to include all non- and pre-linguistic organisms, everything 
from sedentary plant life to, presumably, pre-linguistic infants.  This seems to me too coarse a 
definition.  Surely there is a qualitative distinction to be drawn between plants and infants.  
Dewey in fact provides an excellent criterion for making a more fine-grained distinction at 
this level in his discussion of  anticipation.  For present purposes I’ve found it convenient to 
subdivide the psycho-physical level between sedentary psycho-physical1 events, which are 
characterized by the interest-discrimination-sensitivity-satisfaction circuit, and motile psycho-
physical2 events, which are characterized by the anticipation-feeling-consciousness-habit circuit. 
 
Affordances 
 
The environment for a psycho-physical1 system is far richer than the environment of  
a purely physical system.  Physical systems interact with a more or less mechanical ecology 
of  physical dispositions.  Psycho-physical1 systems by contrast inhabit what Gibson calls a 
niche, or an interlocking and interdependent ecology of  co-reinforcing affordances.154  Gibson 
coined the term affordance to refer to an environmental disposition for which the 
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manifestation conditions necessarily involve both an organism with the right sort of  
properties (size, morphology, behavioral dispositions) and an ecological niche with the right 
sort of  features (medium, surfaces, objects, etc.).  For example, a branch in a tree may afford 
the function of  perching for birds such as sparrows or crows.  This can be expressed in 
another way by saying that the capacity for perching is a function of  the coupled system 
branch-and-sparrow.  This capacity however would typically fail, and fail quite spectacularly, to 
supervene upon coupled systems that do not have the right sorts of  properties, such as the 
systems branch-and-elephant and branch-and-dolphin.  Where the causal powers and capacities of  
an organism intersect the causal powers and capacities within an environment without 
cancellation, we can say that the environment instantiates an objective affordance relative to 
that organism.   
Affordances are irreducibly perspectival, in the sense that I have been using the term.  
The same tree that affords perching to the sparrow also affords climbing to the cat.  The 
bird and feline, though they may inhabit the same physical environment, occupy different 
and unique ecological niches.  The same mechanical dispositions will impinge upon both 
organisms, but the affordances for interaction offered by the environment will show up only 
for the organism that can take advantage of  them.  The cat and the sparrow thus represent 
perspectival loci of  individual niches overlapping a common dispositional space.   
Gibson’s account of  affordances, organisms, and niches maps relatively cleanly onto 
the ontology of  dispositions, events, and situations outlined in Chapter IV.  In one sense, 
an affordance is simply a disposition considered at a higher level of  organizational 
complexity.  Similarly, a niche is a situation opened relative to an organism.  The change in 
terminology is of  course useful to mark a change of  level, but there is more to this 
distinction.  The particular balance of  the local ecology – how the relative affordances 
inhibit or reinforce each other, what possibilities are opened or cancelled – is vital to the 
success of  the organism.  Should the balance of  prey-capture strategies afforded to the cat 
outweigh the balance of  predator-avoidance strategies afforded to the sparrow, so much the 
worse for the bird.  There is thus an irreducibly evaluative dimension to affordances that is 
absent from physical dispositions. 
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Value 
 
The objective value of  environmental affordances for the organism enters the picture 
when the organism, in order to preserve a coherent structural integrity, needs to selectively 
discriminate between competing possibilities for interaction with its environment.  Once an 
interaction is selected, its outcome has the potential, new to this level, to succeed or fail to 
satisfy the tensional need of  the organism.  This is different than saturation, which signals a 
return to a tentative equilibrium between system and environment.  The saturation of  an 
event space does not succeed or fail to satisfy an adjustment cycle; it merely terminates the 
cycle.  As such, the adjustments are rendered no more or less likely to recur as a result of  
their consequences.  Should the results satisfy the needs of  an organism, however, the 
tendency to select in favor of  whatever actions resulted in that outcome is increased.  
Similarly, the probability of  selections in favor of  unsatisfactory outcomes is decreased.  In 
this way, the consequences of  interactions with environment are conserved in the organism, 
enabling it to more effectively conserve its characteristic historical pattern.   
Unlike the straight-forward saturation of  an event space in physical systems, the 
satisfaction of  the event-cycle is predicated upon the capacity of  the organism to (a) 
recognize differences in immediate stimuli; (b) respond selectively towards them; and (c) 
recursively monitor the outcome of  that selection in order to evaluate its quality with regard 
to the satisfaction of  the original need.  Successful adjustments at this level thus require the 
emergence of  qualitatively new powers unavailable and unnecessary at the physical level.   
This represents a significant shift in the quality of  the transactions of  psycho-
physical1 systems relative to purely physical systems.  The latter are purely reactive, 
responding mechanically to environmental stressors that impinge upon their present state.  
Psycho-physical1 systems do this as well, but they also display sensitivity to environmental 
stressors that impinge upon the maintenance of  what Dewey calls their “characteristic 
pattern of  active equilibrium.”155  Unlike physical systems, psycho-physical1 systems have a 
biologically invested interest in preserving the quality of  their conserved historical patterns.  
This interest of  the organism with regard to the selection of  one outcome over another 
represents the seed of  the evaluative function.   
In order to maintain internal structural integrity across transactions, the system needs 
the capacity to discriminate among competing moves within its event space.  This requires a 
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level of  sensitivity to the contours of  environmental stimuli beyond the purely mechanical 
reactivity of  physical systems.  This sensitivity to the relational contours of  a situation is the 
capacity for registering the affordances of  an environment.  This is signaled in the model by 
a shift from the linear need-demand-selectivity-saturation cycle of  physical systems to the more 
complex interest-discrimination-sensitivity-satisfaction circuit of  psycho-physical1 systems.   
The difference between a cycle and circuit in this sense refers to the capacity for 
recursion in the latter.156  Unlike purely physical events, where the progression from systemic 
tension to saturation is linear, the regulation of  psycho-physical1 events requires a system of  
feedback to exist between the newly emergent powers of  sensitivity and discrimination. 
When sensitivity and discrimination are further augmented by the repeated satisfaction of  
needs, the results feed back into the honing and refining of  the interests of  the organism.  
This process of  interest-discrimination-sensitivity-satisfaction thus forms an internal circuit that 
drives the accelerated evolution of  psycho-physical1 events relative to their purely physical 
counterparts.  I will refer to this type of  circuit going forward as an adjustment circuit. 
In the case of  a linear cycle, the system reacts in a relatively stable fashion that is not 
in general affected one way or the other by the outcome of  its interactions.  In the case of  a 
living organism, however, the system does hone its responses in light of  outcomes.  This 
brings an increased flexibility to higher-order systems relative to the purely physical.  Once 
competing possibilities for action are detected, then a choice must be made between 
alternate plans of  action, and this choice will bring about objective consequences for the 
agent.  The choice of  any particular course of  interaction corresponds with the opening of  
an event space that can be directed, through the manipulation of  its internal dispositions, 
towards the realization of  a ‘new normal,’ an adjusted stable coherence that is more in line 
with the evaluative preferences of  the agent.  The organism that is able to regulate this 
process successfully may be said to grasp the meaning of  the event.  
 
The Psycho-Physical2 Level 
 
The initiation of  a psycho-physical2 event is triggered at the disruption of  an 
organism’s habitual responses to its sensory ecology, as illustrated in Figure 7 below.  An 
organism’s sensory ecology may be defined as the coupled system comprised of  the sensing 
organism and any relevant sensory information within its environment.  As an example, 
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consider the sensory ecology of  a weakly electric fish such as the South American black 
ghost knifefish.  The knifefish generates an omnidirectional volume of  electricity that it 
projects into the surrounding water.  As objects move through this electrical field, variations 
in their respective conductivity are registered by the knifefish as localized voltage 
perturbations.  By this method, the knifefish detects the presence of  predators and prey 
within its environment.157  Neuroethologists like Malcolm MacIver refer to organisms that 
employ such object-detection strategies as active sensing organisms.  By contrast, animals such as 
humans that rely on external energy sources such as ambient sunlight to detect objects in 
their environment are passive sensing organisms.   
 
 
 
Figure 7. The Psycho-Physical2 Level 
 
 
From the familiar vantage point of  an active sensor, the sensory ecology of  the 
knifefish appears at first truly alien.  Upon reflection, however, it is not so different from our 
own.  For both active and passive sensing organisms, sensory information turns up in the 
form of  variations within an otherwise invariant field.  For humans, this is the field created 
by local ambient light rather than an energetic probe.158  Gibson refers to this field as the 
ambient optical array – a volume of  structured light that provides information about the 
environment in the form of  disturbances caused by environmental surfaces.159   
Disturbances in the anticipated structure of  the array show up for the organism as 
disruptions in its habitual patterns of  behavior.  Becoming perceptually aware of  something, 
for Dewey, always involves some disruption in the ‘completely integrated function’ that is 
characteristic of  an organism whose habitual response patterns are in complete equilibrium 
with its ecology.160  This breakdown of  functional integration signals a tension, a problem 
that requires attention.  Consciousness for Dewey thus represents a self-monitoring capacity 
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of  coupled organism-environment systems that emerges in response to a need for immediate 
readjustment somewhere within the system.161 
Conservation of  historical coherence within such a spread-out ecology depends 
upon an extremely complex network of  relations, including those that are spatio-temporally 
distant.  The wider structural qualities of  the situation thus matter to the psycho-physical2 
system; they make a difference with regard to its historical development, in a much more direct 
way than for systems at lower levels.  Such powerful qualities are of  course always operative, 
but they may be frustrated in their manifestation by their relational situations.  The apple is 
trying to be just as red when it is interacting with other apples as it is with regard to Bob and 
Alice.  The difference is that redness is a quality of  apples that does not, in general, make a 
difference with regard to their interactions with other apples, and thus it will find no 
cooperative dispositional partners there.   
What must emerge at the level of  the motile organism, with its spread-out ecology, is 
susceptibility to the qualitative features of  such an environment.  The precondition for such 
susceptibility is that the powers of  the organism must be tuned to the cooperative 
manifestation of  these sensible qualities.  The redness of  the apple then finds its cooperative 
dispositional partners in the powers of  psycho-physical2 organisms for whom it makes a 
difference and thus may become manifest.162  As Dewey notes, the “difference [between red 
and green] is proleptically qualitative; it refers to a unique difference of  potentiality in the 
affairs under consideration.”163   
 
Anticipation 
 
As with the interest-discrimination-sensitivity-satisfaction circuit formed at the adjustment 
phase of  the psycho-physical1 level there is a corresponding adjustment circuit at the psycho-
physical2 level comprised by the circuit of  anticipation-feeling-consciousness-habit.  In the former 
level, this circuit was charged with regulating the adjustment phase towards the maintenance 
of  a historical pattern of  activity.  So it is with the adjustment circuit at the psycho-physical2 
level.  For psycho-physical2 events however a new power, that of  plan-making, is required in 
order for the successful manifestation of  the evaluative power.  This is because organisms at 
the psycho-physical2 level are competing within an ecology that is extended in both space 
and time.   
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One of  the more prescient and ingenious facets of  Dewey’s emergence model is the 
significant role assigned to the function of  anticipation in psycho-physical organisms.  In 
anticipating the potential outcome to some action or sequence of  actions, the organism is 
considering relations that go well beyond the immediate contingencies of  its present 
situation.  This capacity thus involves not only the power to discriminate selectively between 
competing stimuli mentioned, but also a new power – the ability to infer from the events 
that are present to events that are not.  This level of  the model is thus individuated by the 
emergence of  the subjunctive.  Here, the organism gains the capacity to reason from the 
present to the future, and thus from the actual to the possible.     
When the contours of an event’s relational structure are temporally extended 
throughout a wide sensory ecology in this way, this temporal dimension shows up 
qualitatively in what Dewey refers to as the sense of  the situation.164  The anticipation of  
danger or satisfaction thus registers for the organism as a felt quality of  its environment.  
Such feelings according to Dewey form the basis for consciousness.165   
Dewey is not alone in associating the emergence of  consciousness with the 
emergence of  the capacity for imaginative planning.  Bruce Bridgeman, professor of  
psychobiology at University of  California Santa Cruz, for example defines consciousness 
explicitly as “the operation of  the plan-executing mechanism, enabling behavior to be driven 
by plans rather than immediate environmental contingencies.”166  MacIver (2009) has 
suggested that “the expansion of  the range with which animals can monitor external space, 
relative to their usual velocities, has been one – perhaps the dominant – driving force for the 
evolution for the ability to plan.”167  Thus planning emerges as a precondition for 
consciousness, and an extended sensory ecology emerges as a precondition for the capacity 
for plan-making.  MacIver calls this the buena vista (or ‘good view’) sensing hypothesis.   
The central claim of  MacIver’s model is identical in its broad strokes to that of  
Dewey’s model: the expansion of  the organism’s sensory ecology into space is equivalent to 
its extension in time.  The organism’s sensory ecology opens a region of  potential activity 
between the detection of  an object and its encounter.  Such a temporally-extended visual 
field forces the organism to weigh their actions against competing potential outcomes.  This 
capacity, MacIver and Dewey both claim, is a necessary precondition for the development of  
counterfactual reasoning and thus for the capacity for planning. 
Within the optical array, for example, there is typically a differential spanning several 
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behavioral cycles between an organism’s immediate surface and a detected object.  This 
translates into a corresponding multiplication of  the range of  potential behavioral strategies 
available in response to the detected object.  In the case of  prey-capture activities, the 
organism would have the opportunity to deliberate between multiple potential paths leading 
to its target, some of  which will be more effective than others.  The organism that reliably 
selects the more efficient prey-capture and/or predator-avoidance strategies clearly has a 
tremendous advantage over the organism that does not.168  An organism that can detect 
alternative possibilities for action within its environment and select appropriately between 
them will, ceteris paribus, out-compete an organism that cannot.   
Various types of  planning and anticipation may be either selectively reinforced or 
discouraged by their outcomes.  Those outcomes that tend to either maintain or restore the 
organism to its habitual pattern of  behavior feed into the structuring of  the organism’s 
historical pattern of  activity.  At this level, we can refer to this historical pattern as the 
habitual mode of  activity of  the organism.  Reciprocally, the habitual structures that emerge 
restrict the choices that are available for the organism in terms of  anticipation and planning.  
The organism is thus always making moves upon the board of  habit, but the contours of  the 
board are always shifting in response to the moves that the organism makes.   
 
The Mental Level 
 
Organisms at the mental level, as illustrated in Figure 8 below, are language users 
reacting to the dynamic ecology of  entrenched socio-linguistic habits known as culture.   
 
 
 
Figure 8. The Mental Level 
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By contrast to the sense of  an event discussed above, an event becomes significant 
according to Dewey’s model when it refers to, represents, or is used as a sign of  another 
event.  Once events are taken up as signs, they can be objectified as abstract tools of  analysis 
and regulation. When sense and signification are both present, Dewey says, so also is mind.169   
Mind, for Dewey, “is an added property assumed by a feeling creature, when it 
reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, 
communication.”170  Once languaged minds have objectified events by recognizing their 
immediate sense and potential significance, these significant objects may then be implicated 
in “making possible and fulfilling shared cooperation.”171  They thus acquire meaning, in 
Dewey’s sense of  the word, as a result of  their assimilation into the shared world of  
linguistic communication.  This shared, linguistically-mediated world is the tapestry of  
culture.   
 This is the only level with two interrelated circuits.  The adjustment circuit of  
signification-objectification-mind-meaning creates the stabilized meanings that feed back into the 
tensional culture-language user-signification circuit.  Thus the entire situation within which the 
event cycle initiates – a language user embedded within a culture – is dynamically modified 
by the events that occur.  Culture is thus a far more unstable and dynamic beast than the 
dispositional, affordant, and sensory ecologies that mark the lower levels. 
 
Meaning 
 
 In his problematic discussion of  minds and meaning, Dewey opts for a model 
wherein the object of  consciousness is always an ‘object’ in the sense of  having been 
intentionally objectified within a language game.172  An object for Dewey is an event that has 
been brought via inquiry into a meaningful cognitive relationship with other events.  This is 
to say that we always perceive events under a meaning of  one sort or another.  What we 
grasp is therefore never a bare event, but always a refined object of  inquiry that has been given 
meaningful structure via its functional role within a network of  meanings.  ‘Event’ in this 
sense has the connotation of  eventual – events represent raw becomings not yet associated with 
a meaningful context.  Dewey’s direct realism thus comes qualified by the clause that “form, 
not matter, is the object of  knowledge.”173    
Mind for Dewey involves a wide network of  social meaning.  Consciousness is that 
77 
 
array of  social meaning brought to bear upon a particular crisis.  Unfortunately, by rendering 
both consciousness and perception in terms of  the transformation of  meaning, and by 
explicitly identifying meaning with human social practices, Dewey finally identifies 
consciousness and perception both with the norms of  human discourse.  The conclusion 
seems to be that only socially-embedded language users actually perceive anything, and that 
what they perceive is linguistically-determined mental forms.  This view of  meaning, Murphy 
complains, serves to “falsify the whole theory” of  natural continuity.174  It is certainly open 
to accusations of  linguistic idealism, and in this case the charges appear reasonable. 
But it doesn’t have to work this way.  There are tools consistent with the current 
ground-map that may be used to construct meaningful models that are less vulnerable to 
charges of  idealistic backsliding.  In particular, the tools provided by Gibson’s ecological 
theory will again prove useful.  Gibson, like Dewey, insists that it is meaning that is the 
object of  immediate experience.  It is, in both cases, the form of  the situation, rather than its 
material content, that is the object of  conscious apprehension.175  What we perceive is not 
bare relations, vectors, or the quantitative values of  variables; it is the quality of  the situation.  
Unlike Dewey however, Gibson locates meaning directly within the organism’s ecology.  
According to Gibson’s model, the niche of  an organism is directly meaningful to that 
organism because it affords possibilities of  interaction for that organism.   
Our experience, according to Gibson’s model, is of  a dynamic world of  capacities 
for potential interactions.  This world of  possibilities is negotiated upon the basis of  the 
objective values of  competing affordances.  The sparrow does not perceive the branch and 
then embark upon a series of  explicit cognitive evaluations of  the relative load-bearing 
capacities of  particular arboreal species before making the determination to land.  The fact 
that the branch affords the perching function for the sparrow makes the branch available to 
the sparrow as a possible locus of  interaction.  The sparrow not only directly detects the 
presence of  the affordances within its niche but also directly detects the affordances as 
meaningful.  Affordances in this way function as transparent attractors for the sorts of  
organisms for which they have value.   
The qualitative dimensions of  events thus do not emerge only relative to language-
users; form and quality go all the way down, marking the contours of  networks of  
dispositions and relations, individuating one event from another by virtue of  its unique 
historical impact upon its situational ecology.  Language users are of  course able to use the 
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meanings of  events in a host of  new ways, outlined by Dewey, to facilitate possibilities of  
shared cooperation and world-building that are mostly closed to other agents.176  This is 
certainly enough to mark off  both the qualitative shift in functional organization and the 
emergence of  new powers necessary to individuate the level of  language users from lower 
levels.  But the world would be available for such use even should no such language users 
exist, and this condition has certainly been the case for far longer than philosophers have 
been bartering linguistic tokens.   
Dewey’s objective relativism and pragmatism would both seem to resonate well with 
this model.  The former, because it provides for the primitivity of  directedness and 
perspectivity within the context of  coupled organism-environment systems; the latter, 
because it recognizes the meaning of  events to be inextricably bound up with their 
consequences.  The significant individuating fact about an event is what it may become, what 
consequences may follow from its transactions with other events.177  To grasp the structure 
of  environmental relations is thus to gain direct insight into the evolution of  events by 
grasping the potential forms they could enact as a result of  their transactions.   
 
Intelligibility 
 
Dewey’s linguistic version of  this story does offer a number of  important 
observations, not the least of  which is the close relationship between meaning, experience, 
and intelligibility.  Dewey insists that everything that exists “as far as it is known and 
knowable is in interaction with other things.”178  This observation is certainly correct.  In 
order for something to be knowable it must make some difference, cause some change in the 
world.  Unless quiddities are to be allowed, every existent must be in some sense causally 
relevant if  it is to be granted a role within a responsible ontology.  There is thus some parity 
between the existence and the detectability of  events.  Anything capable of  making a genuine 
difference in the world is capable of  being detected at least indirectly via that difference.   
That a system is detectable testifies to the presence of  some objective pattern 
emerging from the ongoing dance of  regulative structural and unfolding process.  The 
ontology outlined thus far, by virtue of  its insistence upon the ubiquity of  causal relevance 
and relational conditioning, is an ontology for a world that is in principle experienceable.   Any 
real pattern, by virtue of  its relations and the differences that they make, is open to direct or 
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indirect detection, as well as determinations as to frequency and regularity, robustness under 
different constraints, and all of  the other practices that are the purview of  the laboratory 
sciences.   
Events dispose towards their detection by agents sensitive to their qualitative 
dimensions, and they do so regardless of  the presence or even existence of  such agents.  
The first hydrogen atom spit forth by the universe was capable by virtue of  its causal-
relational profile of  detection and thus of  entering into at least indirect experience.  
Considered in its relations to other events within a situation and thus from a perspective, the 
same atom enters into a wider structural profile that may be directly experienced by the right 
sorts of  agents as the qualitative structure, felt or perceived, of  its immediate environment.   
From the fact that the world is experienceable it follows swiftly that the world is also 
intelligible and thus capable of  being understood as meaningful and expressed as such to other 
agents.  The world is logiscible, to use Dewey’s somewhat unwieldy term.179  Upon this point 
Dewey’s linguistic understanding of  meaning is sound.  Events make differences, and 
differences are detectable, and, so detected, they may be transmitted as information.  All 
meaning thus is linguistic, at least potentially.   
But it is also more than this.  I have, throughout this paper, been using the 
expression ‘real patterns’ to describe the various objective properties of  events.  The 
terminology comes from Daniel Dennett, who uses it in an epistemological sense to refer to 
information that is objectively specifiable within a given data set.180  For example, if  we 
wanted to send a digital image electronically, we could transmit a point-for-point bitmap that 
specified every pixel in the image.  But this would be a very inefficient way to convey 
information.  It would be far more efficient to compress some of  the data within the original 
image.  But what data should be compressed?   
Suppose the original image is truly random.  Dennett, following Gregory Chaitin 
(1975), notes that a random data set cannot be compressed without being destroyed.  The 
point-for-point bitmap is the only version of  the random set that may be transmitted.  This 
is because a random set has no structure, there is no objectively specifiable pattern that may 
be isolated within the data.  But this is not the case for a non-random set.  A non-random set 
is structured, it contains at least one objectively real pattern.  Should we wish to transmit the 
non-random image, we need only to isolate its salient patterns and screen off  everything 
else.  This in effect compresses the size of  the data while preserving (or even enhancing) its 
80 
 
informational content.   
 It could of  course be the case that there are many patterns that could potentially be 
identified within a given data set.  Perhaps certain of  these embedded patterns will stand out 
more strongly for agents from particular cultural backgrounds or with particular expectations 
or biases.  If  three different agents should identify three different patterns, which should we 
say is the ‘real pattern?’  All of  them, says Dennett.  Any pattern that may be objectively 
isolated via compression must be objectively present within the data set in the first place.  
The patterns are thus objectively identifiable from the relative standpoint of  different 
observers, and thus ‘real’ by any useful meaning of  the term.   
Nature is full of  such real patterns; this paper has largely been concerned with 
drawing a metaphysical ground-map that allows for them to be treated with the ontological 
seriousness that they warrant.  It is certainly true also that detectable events may be 
compressed and transmitted in conformity to the syntactical patterns of  language.  But this 
does not necessarily exhaust their potential for compression and transmission.  Information 
relating the location of  a particular flower, for example, seems to be capable of  meaningful 
and remarkably efficient transmission by means of  the waggle dance of  the honeybee.   
Dewey at times would seem to discount such forms of  non-human communication 
because they fail to conform to the socio-linguistic structure that he takes to be essential to 
the communicative act.  But language is simply one way of  compressing data among many 
others.  Behaviors involving coordinated communication, tool usage, and the transmission 
of  information across generations appear to be far more widespread among non-linguistic 
animals than initially thought in Dewey’s time.  It could very well be the case that, should 
Dewey have glimpsed the development of  science in this area, he would have acknowledged 
a much more meaningful universe than his socio-linguistic interpretation of  mind would 
seem to permit. 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
147 See Heft 2001 for a more complete analysis of  this connection. 
 
148 LW1:194. 
 
149 LW1:195. 
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150 LW1:162. 
 
151 See e.g. Martin 1986 and Chapter 8 of  Mumford and Anjum 2011.  U. T. Place and John 
Heil have also offered support for this position. 
 
152 Molnar calls this the ‘Brentano Thesis,’ after the work of  Franz Brentano 1874. 
 
153 See Chapter 8, sections 8.7 and 8.8. 
 
154 Gibson 1986, p.128-30. 
 
155 LW1:194. 
 
156 e.g. sensitivity to environing conditions should sharpen discrimination, which should 
sharpen sensitivity to environing conditions, etc. 
 
157 Snyder et. al. 2007 and MacInver 2009. 
 
158 Apart from the lesser energetic cost paid by passive sensors.  See MacIver 2009. 
 
159 Gibson 1986. 
 
160 LW1:237. 
 
161 LW1:236ff. 
 
162 i.e., to telereceptive organisms that register the color red. 
 
163 LW1:204. 
 
164 LW1:198. 
 
165 The emphasis placed upon feeling as a precondition for consciousness echoes 
contemporary work in neuroscience (cf. Damasio 1995).   
 
166 Bridgeman 1992, p.1. 
 
167 MacIver 2009, p.492. 
 
168 MacIver 2009. 
 
169 LW1:200. 
 
170 LW1:198. 
 
171 LW1:142. 
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172 LW1:244. 
 
173 LW1:246. 
 
174 Murphy 1963. 
 
175 cf. LW1:240. 
 
176 cf. LW1 Chapter V. 
 
177 LW1:105. 
 
178 LW1:138. 
 
179 See especially LW12. 
 
180 Dennett 1990.  See also Ladyman and Ross 2007 for an application of  this concept to 
ontological concerns. 
83 
 
REFERENCES CITED 
 
Alexander, Samuel. Space, Time, and Deity. Boston: Adamant Media Corporation, 1920. 
 
Armstrong, D.M., C.B. Martin, and U.T. Place. Dispositions: A Debate. New York:  
 Routledge, 1996. 
 
Aspect, Alain, Philippe Grangier, and Gérard Roger. “Experimental Tests of Realistic Local 
 Theories via Bell’s Theorem.” Physical Review Letters 47 (1981): 460-463. 
 
Aspelmeyer, Markus, Anton Zeilinger, Simon Gröblacher, Tomasz Paterek, Rainer 
 Kaltenbaek, Caronaslav Brukner, and Marek Zukowski. “An experimental test of 
 non-local realism.” Nature. 446 (2007): 871-875. 
 
Beck, Lewis White. Philosophic Inquiry. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952. 
 
Beckermann, Ansgar; H Flohr; Jaegwon Kim (eds.). Emergence or Reduction? : Essays on the  
 Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. New York: de Gruyter, 1992. 
 
Bell, J.S. “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox,” Physics 1.3 (1964): 195-200. 
 
Bickhard, Mark H. and Donald T. Campbell. “Emergence.”  Downward Causation.  Oxford: 
 Aarhus University Press, 2000. 322-348. 
 
Bickhard, Mark H. and Richard J. Campbell. “Physicalism, Emergence and Downward 
 Causation.” Axiomathes 21.1 (2011): 33-56. 
 
Bird, Alexander. “Dispositions and Antidotes.” Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1998):227-234. 
 
Bird, Alexander. “Antidotes All the Way Down?” Theoria 51 (2004): 259-269. 
 
Block, Ned. “Do Causal Powers Drain Away?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  67.1 
 (2003):  133-150. 
 
Bode, Boyd. “‘Pure Experience’ and the External World.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology  
 and Scientific Methods 2.5 (1905): 128-133. 
84 
 
Bohr, Neils. “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered 
 Complete?” Institute for Theoretical Physics 47(1935): 696-702. 
 
Boisvert, Raymond D. Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press,  
 1988.   
 
Boisvert, Raymond D. “Dewey’s Metaphysics: Ground-Map of the Prototypically Real.” 
 Reading  Dewey. Larry A. Hickman (ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
  1998. 149-165. 
 
Boodin, John Elof. “Functional Realism.” The Philosophical Review 43:2 (1934): 147-178. 
 
Brentano, Franz. Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. L. L. McAlister (ed.).  New Jersey:  
 Humanities Press (1874). 
 
Broad, Charlie Dunbar. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. New York: Routledge, 1925. 
 
Buchler, Justus. Nature and Judgment. New York: Grosset, 1966. 
 
Cao, Yu Tian. “Structural Realism and Quantum Gravity.” Dean Rickles, Steven French, and  
Juha Saatsi (eds.).  The Structural Foundations of  Quantum Gravity. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2006. 40-52. 
 
Cartwright, Nancy. The Dappled World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Chaitin, Gregory. “Randomness and Mathematical Proof.” Scientific American CCXXXII  
 (1975): 47-52. 
 
Clayton, Philip and Paul Davies (eds.). The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis 
 from Science to Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Corradini, Antonella and Timothy O’Connor (eds.). Emergence in Science and Philosophy. New 
 York: Routledge, 2010. 
 
Cunningham, Byron. “The Reemergence of Emergence.” Philosophy of Science, 68 
  (2001): 62-75. 
 
Damasio, Antonio. The Feeling of What Happens. Orlando: Harcourt, 1995. 
 
Davidson, Donald. “Mental Events.” Experience and Theory. Amherst: University of 
 Massachusetts Press, 1970. 
85 
 
 
Dennett, Daniel C. “Real Patterns.” The Journal of Philosophy 88:1 (1991). 27-51. 
 
D’Espagnat, Bernard. Reality and the Physicist: Knowledge, Duration, and the Quantum World. 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
Dewey, John. “Immediate Empiricism.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Middle Works, 1899-1924 
 Volume 3. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008. 
 
Dewey, John. “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Middle 
 Works of John Dewey, Volume 4, 1899-1924. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
 Press,  2008. 
 
Dewey, John. “The Short-Cut to Realism Examined.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Middle Works of 
 John Dewey, Volume 6, 1899 - 1924. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
 2008.  
 
Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. Jo Boydston (ed.). The Later Works of John Dewey,  Volume 
 1, 1925 - 1953. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008. 
 
Dewey, John. “Substance, Power and Quality in Locke.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Later Works 
 of John  Dewey, Volume 2, 1925-1927. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
 2008. 
 
Dewey, John. “The Changing Intellectual Climate.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Later Works of  
 John Dewey, Volume 2, 1925-1927. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
 2008. 
 
Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Jo Boydston (ed.). The Later Works of John Dewey, 
 Volume 12, 1925 - 1953. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008. 
 
Dorato, Mauro. “Properties and Dispositions: Some Metaphysical Remarks on Quantum  
Physics.” Angelo Bassi, Detlef Dürr, Tullio Weber and Nino Zanghi (eds.). Quantum 
mechanics : are there quantum jumps? Melville: American Institute of Physics, 2006. 
 
Dowe, Phil. “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity 
 Theory.” Philosophy of Science. 59.2 (1992): 195-216. 
 
 
 
86 
 
Drake, Durant. “The Approach to Critical Realism.” in Durant Drake, A.O. Lovejoy, J.B. 
 Pratt, A.K. Rogers, George Santayana, R.W. Sellars, and C.A. Strong. Essays in 
 Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of The Problem of Knowledge. London: MacMillan and 
 Co., 1920. 
 
Einstein, Albert, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen. “Can Quantum-Mechanical 
 Description of  Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” Institute for Advanced Study 
 47(1935): 777-780. 
 
Elder, Crawford L. “Alexander’s Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects.” Topoi (2003): 
 163-171. 
 
Emmeche, Claus, Simo Köppe, and Frederik Stjernfelt. “Explaining Emergence: Towards an  
 Ontology of Levels.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28.3 (1997): 83-119. 
 
Emmeche, Claus, Simo Köppe, and Frederik Stjernfelt. “Levels, Emergence, and Three 
 Versions of Downward Causation.”  Downward Causation.  Oxford: Aarhus 
 University Press, 2000. 322-348. 
 
Engelhard, Kristina. “Categories and the Ontology of Powers: A Vindication of the Identity  
Theory of Properties.” Anna Marmodoro (ed.). The Metaphysics of Powers: Their 
Grounding and Their Manifestation. Routledge: New York, 2010. 
 
Esfeld, Michael. “Quantum Entanglement and a Metaphysics of Relations.” Studies in the  
 History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35.4 (2004): 601-617. 
 
Esfeld, Michael. “Humean Metaphysics Versus a Metaphysics of Powers.” Ernst, Gerhard 
 and Andreas Huttemann (eds.). Time, Chance, and Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of 
 Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 
Fiordo, Richard A. Charles Morris and the Criticism of Discourse. Bloomington: Indiana 
 University Press, 1977. 
 
Floridi, Luciano. “Informational Realism.” Selected Papers from Conference on Computers and 
 Philosophy - Volume 37. Darlinghurst: Australian Computer Society, Inc., 2005. 7-21. 
 
Gale, Richard. The Divided Self of William James. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
 
Gibson, James J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Mahwah: Lawrence  
 Erlbaum Associates, 1986. 
 
87 
 
Hahn, Lewis E. A Contextualistic Theory of Perception. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
 1942.  
 
Harlow, Victor E. Bibliography and Genetic Study of American Realism. Oklahoma City: Harlow, 
 1931. 
 
Hawthorne, John. “Causal Structuralism.” Noûs 35 (2001): 361-378. 
 
Heft, Harry.  Ecological Psychology in Context: James, Gibson, Roger Barker, and the Legacy of William 
 James’s  Radical Empiricism. Psychology Press, 2001.  
 
Heft, Harry. “Restoring Naturalism to James’s Epistemology: A Belated Reply to Miller &  
Bode.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 38.4 (2002): 559-580. 
 
Heil, John. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. 
 
Heil, John. “Powerful Qualities.” Anna Marmodoro (ed.). The Metaphysics of Powers: Their 
 Grounding and Their Manifestation. Routledge: New York, 2010. 
 
Holt, E.B., W.T. Marvin, W.P. Montague, R.B. Perry, W.B. Pitkin, E.G. Spaulding. “The 
Program and First Platform of Six Realists.” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Methods 7.15 (1910): 393-401.  
 
Holt, E.B., W.T. Marvin, W.P. Montague, R.B. Perry, W.B. Pitkin, E.G. Spaulding. The New 
Realism: Coöperative Studies in Philosophy. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1922. 
 
Hook, Sydney. “Introduction to Experience and Nature.” Jo Boydston (ed.). The Later Works of  
 John Dewey, Volume 1, 1925 - 1953. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2008. 
 
Hume, David. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.). 
3rd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1748. 
 
Jackson, Frank. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.” Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982):127-136. 
 
Jacobs, Jonathan D. “Powerful Qualities, Not Pure Powers.” The Monist 94:1 (2011). 81-102. 
 
James, William. Principles of Psychology. Harvard University Press, 1890. 
 
James, William. “Does Consciousness Exist?” Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Bison 
 Books,  1912a. 
 
88 
 
James, William. “A World of Pure Experience.” Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: 
 Bison Books, 1912b. 
 
James, William. “The Thing and Its Relations.” Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Bison 
 Books, 1912c. 
 
James, William. Manuscripts, Essays, and Notes. Harvard University Press, 1988. 
 
Johnston, Mark. “How to Speak of the Colors.” Philosophical Studies 68 (1992): 221-263. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. “‘Downward Causation’ in Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism.” 
 Emergence or Reduction? : Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism. New York: 
 de Gruyter, 1992. 119-138. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. “Making Sense of Emergence.” Philosophical Studies, 94 (1999): 3-36. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. Mind in a physical world: An Essay on the Mind-body Problem and Mental Causation.  
Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
 2005. 
 
Kim, Jaegwon. “Emergence: Core Ideas and Issues.” Synthese 151.3 (2006): 547-559. 
 
Ladyman, James, Don Ross, David Spurrett, and John Gordon. Every Thing Must Go: 
 Metaphysics Naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Lafferty, T.T. “Empiricism and Objective Relativism in Value Theory.” The Journal of  
Philosophy 46:6 (1949). 141-155. 
 
Lamprecht, Sterling P. “Critical Realism and the External World.” The Journal of Philosophy  
 19:24 (1922): 651-661. 
 
Lamprecht, Sterling P. “Sense Qualities and Material Things.” The Philosophical Review 38:1  
 (1929): 23-41. 
 
Lewis, David K. Philosophical Papers Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 
Lewis, David K. “Finkish Dispositions.” The Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997): 143-158. 
 
 
89 
 
Locke, John.  An Essay concerning Human Understanding.  New York: Oxford University  
 Press, 1690. 
 
Lovejoy, A.O. The Revolt Against Dualism: An Inquiry Concerning the Existence of Ideas.  
New York: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1930. 
 
MacIver, M.A. “Neuroethology: From Morphological Computation to Planning.” The 
 Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. New York: Cambridge Universit Press,  
 2009. 480-504. 
 
MacIver, M.A., Neelesh A. Patankar, and Anup A. Shirgaonkar. “Energy-Information 
 Trade-Offs between Movement and Sensing.” PLoS Comput Biol 6.5 (2010). 
 
Martin, C. and Pfeifer, K. ‘Intentionality and the Non-Psychological.’ Philosophy and 
 Phenomenological Research 46 (1986): 531-554. 
 
Martin, C.B. ‘Dispositions and Conditionals.’ The Philosophical Quarterly 44.174 (1994): 1-8. 
 
Martin, C.B. The Mind in Nature. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Maudlin, Tim. The Metaphysics Within Physics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Mead, George Herbert. “The Objective Reality of Perspectives.” Selected Writings. Chicago:  
 University of Chicago Press, 1964. 
 
McGilvary, Evander Bradley. “A Tentative Realistic Metaphysics.” George P. Adams and 
 Wm. Pepperell Montague (eds.). Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements 
 Vol. II. New York: Macmillan, 1930. 109-134. 
 
McGilvary, Evander Bradley. Toward a Perspective Realism. La Salle: Open Court, 1956.  
 
McKitrick, Jennifer. “A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81.2 
 (2003): 155-174. 
 
McKitrick, Jennifer. “Are Dispositions Causally Relevant?” Synthesis. 114.3 (2005): 357-371. 
 
Mellor, D.H. “In Defense of Dispositions.” The Philosophical Review 83.2 (1974): 157-181. 
 
Molnar, George. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Montague, W.P. “The Story of American Realism.” Philosophy 12:46 (1937): 140-161. 
 
90 
 
Morgan, C. Lloyd. Emergent Evolution. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1926. 
 
Mumford, Stephen. Laws In Nature, London: Routledge, 2004. 
 
Mumford, Stephen and Rani Anjum. Getting Causes from Powers. Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press, 2011. 
 
Murphy, Arthur E.  “Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead.” The Philosophical  
 Review 36:2 (1927): 49-66. 
 
Murphy, Arthur E. “The Anti-Copernican Revolution.” The Journal of Philosophy. 26:11 (1929):  
 281-299. 
 
Murphy, Arthur E.  “What Happened to Objective Relativism.” Reason and the Common Good.  
 Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963a. 67-78.   
 
Murphy, Arthur E.  “McGilvary’s Perspective Realism.” Reason and the Common Good.  
 Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963b. 79-92.   
 
Myers, William T. “Pragmatist Metaphysics: A Defense.” Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce 
 Society, 40.1 (2004): 39-52. 
 
Nagel, Ernest. “Philosophy and the American Temper.” Sovereign Reason. Glencoe: The Free 
 Press, 1954. 
 
Nelson, Charles H. John Elof Boodin: Philosopher-Poet. New York: Philosophical Library, 1987. 
 
Oliver, W. Donald. “The Logic of Perspective Realism.” The Journal of Philosophy, 35:8 (1938): 
 197-208. 
 
Perry, R.B. Present Philosophical Tendencies: A Critical Survey of Naturalism, Idealism, Pragmatism, 
 and Realism Together with a Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James. New York: 
 Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912.   
 
Piatt, Donald A. “That Will-O’-the-Wisp, the Innocent Inscrutable Given.” The Journal of  
Philosophy, 32:13 (1935): 337-350. 
 
Piatt, Donald A. “Dewey’s Logical Theory.” The Philosophy of John Dewey. La Salle: Open  
Court, 1939. 103-134. 
 
 
91 
 
Popper, Karl R. “The Propensity Interpretation of Probability.” The British Journal for the  
 Philosophy of Science. 10:37 (1959): 25-42. 
 
Quine, W.V.O. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-
 Philosophical Essays. Harvard University Press, 1980. 20-46. 
 
Randall, John Herman Jr. Nature and Historical Experience. New York: Columbia University 
 Press, 1958. 143-194. 
 
Robischon, Thomas. “What is Objective Relativism?” The Journal of Philosophy. 55:26 (1958):  
1117-1132. 
 
Rorty, Richard. “Dewey’s Metaphysics.” Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of 
 Minnesota Press, 1982. 
 
Ross, Stephen D. “Skepticism, Holism, and Inexaustibility.” The Review of Metaphysics 35:3  
(1982): 529-556. 
 
Rovelli, Carlo. “Relational Quantum Mechanics.” International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 
 35.8 (1996): 1637-1678. 
 
Russell, Bertrand. “On the Notion of a Cause.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13 (1912): 
 1-26. 
 
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. “Ghosts Walking Underground: Dewey’s Vanishing 
 Metaphysics.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 40.1 (2004): 53-81. 
 
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock. “Pragmatist Metaphysics? Why Terminology Matters.” 
 Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 37 (2001): 13-21. 
 
Shook, John R. “The Direct Contextual Realism Theory of Perception.” The Journal of  
Speculative Philosophy 17:4 (2003). 
 
Smolin, Lee. Three Roads to Quantum Gravity. New York: Basic Books, 2001. 
 
Smolin, Lee. “The Case for Background Independence.” Dean Rickles, Steven French, and 
 Juha Saatsi (eds.).  The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford: Clarendon 
 Press, 2006. 196-239. 
 
Snyder, James B., Mark E. Nelson, Joel W. Burdick, Malcolm A. MacIver. “Omnidirectional 
 Sensory and Motor Volumes in Electric Fish.” PLoS Biology, 5 (2007): 1-13. 
92 
 
 
Sperry, R.W. “A Modified Concept of Consciousness.” Psychological Review, 76.6 (1969): 532-
 536. 
 
Sperry, R.W. “Macro- versus Micro-Determination.” Philosophy of Science, 53.2 (1986):  265-
 270. 
 
Stolnitz, Jerome. “On Objective Relativism in Aesthetics.” The Journal of Philosophy 57:8  
(1960): 261-276.  
 
Worrall, John. “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica 43.1-2 (1989): 99-
 124. 
 
Thom, Rene. Structural Stability and Morphogenesis: An Outline of a General Theory of Models. 
 Westview Press, 1972. 
 
Ushenko,  A.P. Power and Events.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. 
 
Van Cleve, James. “Mind-Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence.” Philosophical  
 Perspectives 4 (1990): 215-226. 
 
Walter, Sven. “The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: 
 Assessing Kim’s Master Argument.” Philosophical Psychology, 21.5 (2008):  
 673–696. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred North. Science and the Modern World. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1926. 
 
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York: The Free  
Press, 1929. 
 
Wimsatt, William C. “The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, 
 Perspectives, and Causal Thickets.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy supp. vol. 20. 
 University of Calgary Press (1994): 207-274. 
 
Zeeman, E.C. “Catastrophe Theory.” Scientific American (1976): 65-83. 
 
Zurek, Wojciech H. “Environment-induced superselection rules.” Physical Review, 26.8 (1982): 
 1862-1880 
 
Zurek, Wojciech H. “Decoherence and the Transition from Quantum to Classical.” Physics 
 Today (1991): 36-44. 
93 
 
 
Zurek, Wojciech H. “Decoherence, Einselection, and the Quantum Origins of the Classical.” 
 Reviews  of Modern Physics, 75 (2003): 715-775. 
 
Zurek, Wojciech H. “Quantum Darwinism.” Nature Physics 5 (2009): 181 - 188. 
